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Following decades of development efforts, cotton became the dominant cash crop in most 
West and Central Africa (WCA) countries. Apart from suitable agro-climatic conditions, the 
increase in cotton production is believed to have reflected the vertically-integrated structure 
of the sectors—similar in all WCA cotton-producing countries—which circumvented the free 
riding risks that would have otherwise constrained its performance. 
The WCA cotton sectors share a number of similarities. The industries were 
pioneered by the French state-owned company CFDT (Compagnie Française de 
Développement des Fibres Textiles)—renamed to DAGRIS (Développement des Agro-
Industries du Sud) in 2001—in conjunction with national state-owned cotton companies.
1 
Initially, cotton was used to supply the French textile industry. The cotton companies had a 
legal monopsony in cotton buying, and most had a monopoly on primary processing, 
marketing, and supplying inputs. Typically, the companies would announce a panterritorial 
base buying price before planting, sometimes supplementing that price with a second 
payment (payable in the following season as a bonus) based on the company’s financial 
health. Although throughout the 1980s and 1990s there have been several attempts to change 
the ownership, management structure, and the pricing mechanisms of the cotton companies, 
the panterritorial/panseasonal pricing along with the heavy government involvement in the 
sector have been the key characteristics of the sectors all along. 
Most cotton used to be marketed through COPACO (Compagnie Cotonnière), a 
CFDT subsidiary but that changed during the mid-1980s when most cotton companies begun 
marketing their cotton through independent marketing channels. The cotton industries also 
benefited from research carried out by the French Agricultural Research Institute CIRAD 
                                                 
1 In addition to their core activity which is ginning, the cotton companies would often engage in numerous other 




(Centre de Cooperation Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement) 
(see Table 1 for key institutions involved in the cotton sectors of WCA countries). 
All WCA countries are also similar in that they share a common currency, the CFA 
franc (CFAf) which is fixed against the euro (see Box 1). Consequently, their cotton 
industries (along with the other export-oriented sectors) enjoy the benefits or suffer the 
consequences of the €/$ exchange rate fluctuations. Moreover, the fact that the CFAf is fixed 
against the euro often leads to episodes of misalignment. For example, the overvaluation of 
the CFAf during the early 1990s had adversely affected the competitiveness of the export 
sectors in all WCA countries, including cotton. In 1994 the CFAf was devalued against the 
French franc, thus temporarily restoring the currency equilibrium and competitiveness of the 
cotton industries. 
The objective of this paper is to review the cotton sector policies and reform efforts of 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Senegal and Togo and examine 
the nature and degree of distortions to price incentives.
2 These countries account for almost 
all WCA cotton output which is equivalent to about 3.5 percent of global production. The 
period under consideration spans 1970 to 2005. During this period the prices received by 
growers in all eight countries have been remarkably stable, fluctuating between CFAf 150 
and 200 per kilogram of seed cotton (in real 2000 terms). Given the high variability of world 
prices, the gap between world and domestic prices reflects, for the most part, world price 
movements. 
This paper argues that there have been four periods with distinct but also similar 
characteristics regarding incentives to cotton growers in all eight countries. First, from 1970 
to 1984 (when the price collapse took place) the cotton sectors were heavily taxed with 
growers receiving about one third of the world price (ranging from a low of 30 percent in 
Mali to a high of 45 percent in Côte d’Ivoire). The second period which spans 1985 through 
1993 (the year prior to the CFAf devaluation) was characterized by low world prices and an 
overvalued currency with growers in the region averaging 55 percent of the world price. The 
cotton companies faced severe financial difficulties during the end of that period and they had 
to be rescued repeatedly through budgetary support measures. The third period begins in 
1994 and ends in 1997 when the East Asian financial crisis caused the commodity price 
collapse (including cotton). This period mirrors the first period in terms of high world price 
                                                 
2 The eight countries studied here account for 99 percent of WCA cotton output. Three minor WCA cotton 
producers not included here are Central Africa Republic, Guinea, and Niger.  
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and the low share received by growers (42 percent of world price). Similarly, the last period, 
1998 to the present, is a mirror image of the 1985-93 period, characterized by low world 
prices, growers receiving a relatively high share of world price (59 percent), the CFAf being 
(most likely) overvalued, and the cotton companies facing financial difficulties. The 
similarities between second and fourth period extend to the consideration of policy reforms; 
the key difference is that during the second period policy reforms called for restructuring the 
cotton companies so they become more efficient without altering their ownership structure. 
On the contrary, current policy reforms call for privatizing them. 
The paper concludes that when all costs are considered, including inefficiencies in the 
ginning operations, the sector has been taxed quite heavily. With the exception of Cameroon 
during 1986-93, all countries have been taxed during all periods. Consistent with the share of 
prices received by producers, the rates of taxation were high during 1970-84 and 1994-97 
(averaging 47 and 42 percent, respectively) and low during 1985-93 and 1998-2005 
(averaging eight and five percent, respectively). With a few exceptions, these taxation rates 
have been remarkably similar across all countries. Note, however, that when ginning 
inefficiencies are not factored into the analysis, the second and fourth periods are 
characterized by subsidization. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses the stylized 
facts of the WCA cotton sectors. The third section outlines the reasons why the reform efforts 
currently under consideration should be deepened. The subsequent section gives summary 
descriptions of the history and structure of each cotton sector along with the (limited) reform 
efforts. The penultimate section makes a quantitative assessment of the distortions, while the 
last section concludes. 
 
 
Stylized facts of the WCA cotton sectors 
 
 
The cotton industries performed well … 
 
The performance of the WCA cotton industries has been viewed as a success story (Lele et al. 
1989). Indeed, between 1970 and 1988, WCA cotton yields grew at 6.1 percent per annum, 
which compared to the 1.9 percent annual growth in world yields implies that if trends 
continued, WCA yields would have been similar to world yields by the early 1990s.  
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Moreover, cotton production in WCA increased 10-fold during the last 35 years, from a little 
over 100,000 tons in 1970 to one million tons in 2005. 
In the eight WCA countries studied here, cotton provides income to more than 1.5 
million households, equivalent to some 10 million people. During 2001-03, cotton 
contributed 10 percent to the merchandize exports and 2.1 percent to the GDP of the eight 
countries under consideration (see Table 2 for the importance of cotton as well numerous 
other statistics in all eight countries). In three of the eight countries (Benin, Burkina Faso and 
Mali) cotton is perhaps the single most important economic activity. 
 
… but is not so healthy in terms of productivity … 
 
Yet, the seemingly successful performance of the industries masked a number of weaknesses 
that called into question their long term sustainability. The post-1980 production increase 
solely reflects area expansion (in contrast to pre-1980 which reflected yields increase, mainly 
in response to fertilizer use). A growth decomposition analysis for the 1980-2005 period 
reveals that cotton yields in WCA countries remained (statistically) stagnant (see Figures 1 
and 2). In fact, yields in six of the eight countries declined (Table 3). This compares 
unfavorably with the 1.7 percent annual growth rate of global cotton output, which is a 
reflection of yield increases only (see bottom panel of Table 3). Moreover, a comparison of 
WCA with Southern and Eastern Africa (SEA) shows that, despite their low level, SEA’s 
yields have been growing at the same rate as world yields. 
 
… and has a grossly inefficient pricing mechanism … 
 
The panterritorial pricing mechanism, common to all WCA countries, while it delivered 
remarkable price predictability and stability, as it will be shown later, and also turned out to 
be a convenient and socially popular income redistribution mechanism, in effect transferring 
resources from efficient cotton growers (or growers with transportation and/or location 
advantages) to less efficient ones. This common price within each country has thus 
constrained overall growth and innovation in the industry by penalizing the most productive 
entities (or areas) of the sector. 
Furthermore, growers received low prices even when world prices were extremely 
high (Figures 3-10). For example, during the early 1980s, WCA cotton producers were 
receiving 60-70 CFAf per kilogram for their seed cotton while the world price ranged  
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between (the equivalent of) 200 and 250 CFAf.
3 (For a description of the world price of 
cotton, often referred to as the A Index, see Appendix A.) Similarly, following the 1994 
devaluation of the CFAf, producer prices were adjusted upwards but far less than the increase 
in world price, thus denying WCA cotton growers the high prices enjoyed by cotton 
producers elsewhere. In fact, as the econometric evidence will show later, there is practically 
no comovement between world prices and prices received by cotton growers. This is ironic 
considering that the various price formulae devised to determine the price to be paid to 
growers by the cotton companies use as their staring point the world price of cotton. 
On the other hand, the early announcement of prices which often reflected political 
considerations rather than marker realities without any proper hedging mechanism in place 
implied that the cotton companies (and hence taxpayers of the respective countries or even 
aid agencies) assumed all the risks associated with world price and currency movements. 
Indeed, that meant that in periods of low prices and/or overvalued currency, most cotton 
companies experienced financial difficulties which in turn led to demands for fiscal transfers 
from government budgets, thus putting into jeopardy the fiscal position of these countries. 
For example, during the late 1990s the cotton company of Mali was in no position to manage 
the downturn in cotton prices because the stabilization fund, created to set aside a portion of 
profits from earlier periods of high prices, turned out to be empty, resulting in financial losses 
of CFAf 56 billion ($100 million).
4 Eventually, the cotton company was bailed out. Similar 
bailouts took place in several WCA countries following the two cotton price collapses—in 
the mid-1980s and in the late 1990s.
5 More recently, Burkina Faso, which was supposed to be 
                                                 
3 Cotton refers to cotton lint, sometimes called cotton fiber (the internationally traded commodity). When 
reference to seed cotton (the farm product) is made, it is explicitly mentioned. The rate of conversion from seed 
cotton to cotton lint—the ginning outturn ratio—is currently about 42 percent in all WCA countries, i.e., one kg 
of seed cotton produces 0.42 kgs of cotton lint and 0.58 kgs of seeds, which, in turn, are transformed into cotton 
oil and cotton cake. 
4 Despite the poor performance of price stabilization funds and supply controls (see Gilbert 1996) there have 
been renewed calls for such mechanisms. See, for example, discussions in Ravry et al. (2006) and OXFAM 
(2007). The failure of stabilization mechanisms should not be surprising if one considers that during the seven 
12-month intervals between March 1995 and March 2002, cotton prices declined six times and remained at the 
same level once, without experiencing any increase. Under such circumstances, any stabilization fund is likely 
to go bankrupt no matter how well is run. Conversely, if prices experience continued increases—a less likely 
scenario considering their long term downward trend—the stabilization fund is likely to be subject to misuse, as 
was the case in several WCA countries. 
5 The 1985 cotton price collapse was a result of a policy shift in US commodity programs (including cotton). It 
also reflects a policy shift in China that favored cotton production there. The decline in the late-1990s reflects 
the East Asian financial crisis, again common to most commodities. Nevertheless, cotton has not been part of 
the recent price boom (see Figure 11) with the likely reasons reflecting a combination of the following: (i) 
cotton subsidies continue to depress prices considerably; (ii) productivity gains from genetically modified (GM) 
cotton and other technological advances have kept production costs low, compared to other commodities; and 
(iii) the price increase in the overall commodity price index is due to the increasing demand of certain 
commodities for biofuels production (e.g., maize and sugarcane for ethanol and rapeseed for biodiesel).  
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the star cotton performer in WCA revealed a 3-year cumulative deficit of more than € 100 
million. 
 
Cotton companies still play a central role, but they are inflexible 
 
Because of their inefficient and inflexible structure, the cotton companies were not 
sufficiently prepared (in terms of improved sales strategies, price and exchange rate risk 
management tools, and adoption of new technologies) to respond to the changing nature of 
the external environment, especially the downward trend and volatile nature of world 
prices—a reflection of technological changes and to some extent subsidies by some 
countries.
6 For example, consider that more than one third of global cotton output is now of 
genetically modified origin. Yet, with the exception of Burkina Faso, none of the WCA 
countries has allowed even field trials to assess the likely benefits and risks of such 
technology.
7 Furthermore, research has shown that the benefits of fully utilizing 
biotechnology may be even higher that the benefits from the elimination of all cotton trade 
distortions (Anderson, Valenzuela and Jackson 2008). 
 
The exchange rate environment is not conducive 
 
As noted earlier, the CFAf is fixed against the euro (or the French franc prior to 1999) and 
has been subjected to only one adjustment since 1948—from CFAf 50 to CFAf 100 per FF in 
1994—it often leads to unintended consequences in the sense that WCA cotton growers may 
lose (or gain) from an over (under)-valued CFAf. This should not be surprising given the 
different structure of the euro zone economies compared to those of the WCA countries. 
Therefore, not only the WCA countries have been unable to adjust their currencies in 
accordance to the external environment they faced, cotton growers have been adversely 
affected by the recent weakness of the dollar against the euro. Consider, for example, that 
during 2005/06 the US$ A Index average was roughly the same as in 2000/01. However, 
                                                 
6 For a review of the distortions in the global cotton market see Baffes (2005). The US cotton subsidies were 
subject to a WTO case brought by Brazil (see Schnepf 2004). Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali also 
brought a case to the WTO demanding compensation from the countries that subsidize their cotton sectors (see 
Sumner 2006; Anderson and Valenzuela 2006). 
7 Under the West Africa Regional Biosafety Program, a $23.4-million World Bank technical assis-
tance operation, the WAEMU countries are expected to establish national and regional biosafety poli-
cies and procedures in order to ensure proper assessment of the risks and benefits of biotechnology 
products (World Bank 2006).  
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during the same period the CFAf appreciated from 731 CFAf/$ to 535 CFAf/$, effectively 
reducing the world price of cotton in CFAf terms by 37 percent. Within the current political 
and macroeconomic setting it is beyond the control of individual WCA governments to 
choose the exchange rate regime that is consistent with the structure of their economies—but 
that makes the case for reforms even stronger, because the governments have one less policy 
tool at their disposal. 
 
 
The case for revisiting reform strategies 
 
 
Faced with these constraints, a number of WCA countries began reassessing the structure of 
their cotton industries. With financial and technical assistance from the donor community, 
especially the IMF and the World Bank, policy reforms were contemplated in order to bring 
the cotton sector back to a sustainable development path and, ultimately, increase the welfare 
of cotton growers. However, because the reforms were portrayed as ideologically driven, they 
were viewed with suspicion and, not surprisingly, were subjected to considerable opposition 
from the countries themselves as well as bilateral donors.
8 
In a survey of the cotton sectors of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Benin, Bourdet (2004, p. 
41) described the reasons for such opposition as follows: “There are two reasons behind this 
limited ownership [of reforms] of home government. The first is the strong opposition on a 
part of the urban elite and some farmer associations in cotton-producing countries to the 
privatization of the state-owned ginning enterprises, which are at the center of the network of 
institutions and actors composing the cotton sector. The second is the opposition of some 
bilateral donors, in particular France as the main bilateral donor, to the deregulation of the 
sector. No doubt this ‘lack of enthusiasm’ on the part of the home government of cotton-
producing countries and some bilateral donors has contributed to the slow pace and mixed 
outcome of reforms.” Note that the unwillingness to engage in a serious reform effort during 
the mid-1990s—especially after the CFAf devaluation—reflected the fact that cotton prices 
were high and hence the cotton companies did not face any financial stress while the 
respective governments were benefiting from the taxation. 
                                                 
8 When policy reforms were reconsidered in the mid-1990s, cotton prices were high so the resistance should not 
come as a surprise. It was after the collapse of cotton prices that reforms were seriously discussed. For a lively 
debate between the French and the World Bank on WCA cotton reforms see ICAC (1998a and 1998b). The 
World Bank’s views can also be found in Baffes (2001).  
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Following the price decline that began in 1997, however, it became increasingly 
evident that reforming the cotton industry and allowing the private sector undertake some of 
the industry’s activities was, perhaps, the only feasible alternative.
9 This view was slowly 
accepted, to various degrees, by bilateral donors as well as the countries themselves. For 
example, Edwards (2000, p. 2) concluded that “It is encouraging to note that the sometimes 
acrimonious nature of the recent debate with regard to the future of cotton in the Francophone 
producing countries appears to be giving way to a more constructive dialogue, even if 
consensus on all issues remains elusive.” 
Despite the understanding and “constructive dialogue” policy reforms have been 
limited, while the paths to reforms are quite diverse, as the following summary of the eight 
countries indicates. Reforms in Benin, which were undertaken ‘by function’, consist of three 
key elements: (i) separation of the various links in the cotton supply chain according to the 
different functions (input provision and distribution, seed cotton production, transport, 
ginning, and trading); (ii) division of the responsibility for handling these functions among a 
large number of actors—except for research and extension, which was considered a semi-
public good that needed to be jointly funded by the private and public sectors; and (iii) 
organization of the key decision making process (including issues such as the price setting 
mechanism and cotton delivery time) into horizontally organized entities, which must all 
agree before any sector-wide decision is made. 
The reform process in Burkina Faso was undertaken ‘by region’, in a sense reflecting 
the view that free riding risks of the cotton sector are high, especially with regards to the 
provision of inputs (and hence credit recovery) as well as research and extension services. 
The market is currently structured into three regional monopsonies—a dominant state-owned 
company accounting for about 90 percent of cotton purchases and two private companies, 
accounting for the rest. 
Cameroon has not undertaken any reforms. The cotton company is still the key player 
of all aspects of the industry. However, during the past few years, producers through their 
umbrella organization have been in a position to influence considerably the decision making 
process, especially price determination. Privatization of the cotton company was considered 
in 1994 and again in 2003 but it didn’t progress beyond the discussion stage. 
In Chad, reforms can be characterized, perhaps, as non-existent. Although the 
government of Chad announced that it would disengage from the cotton sector in 1999, with 
                                                 
9 Reform strategies in WCA have been discussed in various contexts. See, for example, Pursell (1998), Badiane 
et al. (2002), Goreux (2004), and Baghdadli (2006).  
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the single exception of the privatization of the cotton oil company, so far it has failed to act 
accordingly. Factors behind the unwillingness to reform include the fiscal difficulties of the 
cotton company (and hence limited interest by the private sector), the lack of ownership of 
reform by the government, and more recently the windfall revenue from crude oil which has 
practically absorbed all capacity and energy by officials who, otherwise, would have been in 
charge of the reform process. 
Côte d’Ivoire undertook reforms in 1998 when the cotton company was broken into 
five entities, four privatively, and one publicly owned. Perhaps, cotton reforms in Côte 
d’Ivoire were the deepest in WCA. However, the performance of the sector has been 
constrained by the civil war. The Northern part of the country where most cotton is produced 
has been practically cut off from the South, the point of export. Not surprisingly, substantial 
quantities of cotton go unrecorded to neighboring Burkina Faso and Mali where producers 
receive a higher price compared to what the companies in Côte d’Ivoire pay. 
Mali, which has contemplated reforms for quite some time, reconsidered its reform 
commitment in July 2004 and decided to proceed cautiously by carefully assessing the pros 
and cons of the reform process in other WCA countries. In November 2005, the government 
increased its share in the capital of the cotton company (from 60 to 70 percent) and publicly 
announced that reforms would be delayed for several years. 
Senegal’s cotton sector went through reforms in 2003, when 51 percent of the cotton 
parastatal’s shares were transferred to DAGRIS while an additional 30 percent was given to 
producers. Although it is too early to assess these limited reform efforts, its cotton output 
during the past few years has been the highest in its history (albeit by a small margin); also 
the prices received by growers have been the second highest (after Benin) during 1998-2005. 
In Togo, which has not undertaken any comprehensive reforms, the structure of its 
cotton sector is less rigid compared to the other countries. Half of Togo’s cotton is privately 
ginned on behalf of the publicly-held cotton company (the remaining is ginned by the cotton 
company). As is the case with Cameroon, the government does not interfere much with the 
sector in the sense that it neither directly taxes it nor supports it in periods of low prices. 








One can safely argue that cotton reforms in WCA countries are far less advanced compared 
to reforms undertaken by cotton producing countries in Eastern and Southern Africa. This 
section summarizes the structure of the cotton sectors along with the key elements and reform 
processes of the eight countries under consideration. 
 
Benin: 30 years experimentation with reforms and still lots of problems 
 
During 2001-03 cotton contributed 37 percent to total merchandize exports and almost 5 
percent to GDP for Benin. An estimated 325,000 households depend on cotton cultivation, 
implying that the livelihoods of nearly 2 million people are directly linked to the industry’s 
performance. The average cotton plot in Benin is about one hectare while the typical 
household produces 450 kilograms of cotton lint, generating roughly $330 in gross income. 
Cotton in Benin is a rainfed crop. Two thirds of cotton growers prepare their land manually 
and some fertilizer and chemicals are used. 
Although Benin has a long tradition in cotton cultivation, which started well before 
the colonial period, it became a commercial crop in 1952 when CFDT introduced a high-
yielding cotton variety. Following independence in 1960, CFDT expanded its operations in 
Northern Benin while another French state-owned company SATEC (Société d’Aide 
Technique et de Coopération) introduced cotton in Central Benin. Towards the end of the 
1960s, numerous Village Associations (Groupments Villageois) were formed specializing in 
input distribution, credit provision, and marketing. 
Under the leftist regime of the 1970s, a new parastatal was created and took over all 
activities of the sector. In 1975 six rural development agencies were created—corresponding 
to the six provinces—with the responsibility of handling input supply and extension services. 
On the other hand, responsibility for ginning operations was given to another company. 
Despite the changes, the sector performed dismally. During 1976-81 cotton output averaged 
7,000 tons, 8,000 tons less than the corresponding average during 1970-75 (see Table B1 in 
Appendix B). Following renewed interest by the government, all cotton-related activities 
were transferred to the new parastatal SONAPRA (Société Nationale pour la Promotion 
Agricole) in 1984, while numerous cotton development projects were introduced. In the 
meantime, the relationship with CFDT improved with the acceptance of limited technical 
assistance. 
Reforms were first contemplated in the early 1990s mainly in response to an earlier 
crisis. Following an exceptionally good crop, cotton output increased form 34,000 tons in  
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1985 to 48,000 tons in 1986. However, the existing ginning operations were unable to 
process all cotton. Moreover, the decline in the world price of cotton (from $1.52/kg in 1985 
to $1.08/kg in 1986) coupled with the appreciation of the CFAf (from 378 CFAf/$ to 316 
CFAf/$) combined with unchanged producer prices of 110 CFAf/kg of seed cotton, caused 
SONAPRA to incur considerable financial losses. Under the Structural Adjustment Program 
of 1991, the government issued a Letter of Rural Development Policy that envisaged the 
transfer of the management of the sector to an interprofessional body based on the principles 
of a common guaranteed panterritorial price to producers, panterritorial prices for inputs, 
obligation for producers to sell their cotton to specific ginners, and obligation for ginners to 
buy all cotton from producers. 
As a result of this policy shift the equivalent of 20 percent of input supply activities 
were privatized in 1993 on a pilot basis, increasing to 80 percent in 1995. SONAPRA 
eventually withdrew from the input supply market in 2000. A second step included issuing 
licenses to three new private ginning operations in 1995, followed by several more in 1998. 
That added 225,000 tons of seed cotton ginning capacity to an existing 335,000 tons by 
SONAPRA. Yet, the new structure caused numerous conflicts resulting in frequent political 
interference. 
In response, the government created a number of entities which assumed 
responsibilities of various aspects of the cotton industry. They include a cooperative 
belonging to the Regional Producers Unions, GAGIA (Coopérative d’Approvisionnement et 
de Gestion des Intrants Agricoles), formed in 1998. A second entity, APEB (l’Association 
Professionnelle des Egreineurs du Bénin), was created in 1999 with key responsibility to 
coordinate activities among ginneries. Another organization was established in 1999, AIC 
(l’Association interprofessionnelle du coton) in order manage supply chain-related functions. 
Finally, CSPR (Centrale de Sécurisation des paiements et de Recouvrement) was formed in 
2000 with the mandate to recover debts from growers, collect and deliver cotton to ginners, 
and make payments to producers. 
Despite the creation of all these organizations and associations, it appears that the 
performance of the sector has not improved. During the 2003/04 season, one quarter of seed 
cotton was bought by private traders, which meant that those farmers who sold to the 
independent traders escaped the credit recovery scheme set up by CSPR. Consequently, 
tensions among different actors have escalated. The difficulties faced by the sector can be 
gauged by the sharp decline in cotton production from 171,000 tons of lint in 2004/05 to 




Burkina Faso: The implosion of a star performer 
 
Cotton is the most important cash crop in Burkina Faso, accounting for almost two thirds of 
total merchandise exports and contributing 5 percent to the country’s GDP in 2001-03. The 
sector provides income to an estimated 210,000 households, implying that the as many as 1.5 
million people are affected by the industry. The average cotton plot in Burkina Faso is a little 
less than 2 hectares. 
Cotton was introduced in Burkina Faso towards the end of the colonial period. The 
development of the sector was the responsibility of CFDT, which remained in charge until 
1975 when it was replaced first by a joint venture between the government and CFDT and in 
1979 by the new cotton company, SOFITEX (La Société Burkinabè des Fibres et Textiles). 
Reforms were first considered in 1991 when, under a Structural Adjustment Program, 
it was decided that management responsibilities of the cotton sector would be transferred to 
growers and the cotton company. In 1998 the government reduced its stake in the cotton 
company by transferring 30 percent of its shares to a producer organization, UNPCB (Union 
Nationale des Producteurs de Coton du Burkina Faso), and 34 percent to DAGRIS 
(Développement des Agro-Industries du Sud). As a second step, a 12-member committee was 
formed in 1999 in order to coordinate the functions of SOFITEX and UNPCB for activities 
such as determination of the farmgate and input prices and management of the research 
program. The committee’s representation consists of seven producers, three SOFITEX 
representatives, and two government representatives. The third step involved the introduction 
of two private companies in 2004 with exclusivity zones for 8 years, representing about 15 
percent of cotton production—the two companies are SOCOMA (Société Cotonnière du 
Gourma) and FASE COTON. In 2006 an umbrella organization was created to coordinate the 
actions of all three cotton companies. 
Until very recently, the reform process in Burkina Faso was considered a success case 
compared to other WCA cotton-producing countries. In fact, AFD produced a report entitled 
“Cotton Cultivation in Burkina Faso: A 30-Year Success Story” (AFD 2004), which noted (p. 
1) “Burkina Faso developed its cotton sector in an original homegrown way. Now one of the 
world’s most competitive cotton industries, it has modern tools and institutions to sustain its 
development.” Indeed, between 1995 and 2005, cotton output in Burkina Faso increased five-
fold, from 64,000 to almost 300,000 tons (see Table B2 in Appendix B). Furthermore,  
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Burkina Faso is the only country in Sub-Sahara Africa (apart from South Africa) which is in 
the process of introducing GM cotton. 
Yet, the expansion of the sector along with the drying up of the cotton stabilization 
fund as well the recently revealed € 110 million 3-year cumulative deficit, may call into 
question the sector’s long term sustainability. Furthermore, it appears that despite the 
entrance of private ginneries as well as the restructuring of the ownership of SOFITEX, the 
government is still the key decision maker in the sector. To address the crisis, a new pricing 
formula has been agreed by the cotton companies and the producers as of March 2006. The 
pricing formula is part of a newly established smoothing fund (fonds de lissage)—to be 
distinguished from the earlier stabilization fund (fonds de soutien). The smoothing fund is 
expected to be professionally managed on agreed and easily monitored parameters (such as 
world price and exchange rate). However, as is the case with all stabilization funds, there is 
always the risk of running large deficits if adverse prices and/or exchange rate conditions 
persist for long. 
 
Cameroon: A well-managed sector—so far, so good
10 
 
Cotton was introduced in Cameroon in the early 1950s under the aegis of CFDT. Initially, it 
was cultivated with only limited use of inputs. Following two decades of stagnation, the 
government promoted the use of inputs, in turn boosting yields from 200 kgs per hectare 
during the mid-1970s to 500 kgs per hectare during the mid-1980s. Since then, cotton 
production increased consistently to reach 100,000 tons of lint by 2000 (see Table B3). 
Cameroon’s cotton sector is managed by SODECOTON (Société de Développement 
du Coton du Cameroun), the cotton parastatal in charge of most aspects of marketing and 
trade. SOEDCOTON, which was established in 1974, is owned by the government (59 
percent), DAGRIS (30 percent), and a private local company (11 percent). Following the 
expansion of cotton during the 1980s, numerous village associations were formed and in 
1994 they became organized cooperatives following an ADF-financed technical assistance 
project. In 2000, with the assistance of SODECOTON, these groups created an umbrella 
organization, OPCC (Organisation des Producteurs de Coton du Cameroun) whose role is to 
represent the interests of cotton producers, especially in the price determination mechanism, 
                                                 
10 For more on distortions to cotton and other products in Cameroon, see Baumou and Masters (2007).  
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and as of 2005, the procurement of inputs. In addition to the marketing of lint, SODECOTON 
manages a cotton oil factory, which is a profitable part of the company. 
The privatization of SODECOTON was first discussed by the government in 1994 
within the framework of a structural adjustment program. However, the attempt did not 
materialize in part because of the poor financial shape of the company and in part due to 
some legal dispute regarding the terms of the sale. The issue of privatization was revisited in 
2003 but did not go beyond the discussion stage. It appears, however, that there is not much 
political interference in the sector. 
 
Chad: Windfall oil revenue puts the cotton reform agenda on the shelf 
 
Chad’s cotton sector is a major part of the economy, contributing 20 percent to total 
merchandize exports and 2.4 percent to GDP in 2001-03. The sector is the key source of 
income to some 200,000 households (or as many as 350,000 according to some sources); with 
an average household size of 5-6 persons, this amounts to 1.2-1.4 million people. The average 
cotton plot is about 1.5 hectares. Chad’s cotton yields are very low, even by WCA standards 
(about half the yields in Benin or Burkina Faso). 
Cotton cultivation was introduced in 1928 under forced labor conditions—Chad was 
the first WCA country to cultivate cotton. Production grew steadily to 40,000 tons during the 
early 1960s, making Chad the leading cotton producer in WCA. During 1970-75, Chad’s 
cotton output averaged 46,000 of cotton lint, almost twice as much as Mali’s average of 
25,000 tons and three times as much as Benin’s and Burkina Faso’s average of 15,000 tons. 
The cotton company of Chad—Cotonchad—was created in 1971, replacing the earlier 
parastatal, Cotonfran. The government is the majority shareholder (75 percent), followed by 
DAGRIS (19 percent), and the local private banking sector (6 percent). The key missions of 
Cotonchad were (and still are) to distribute inputs, purchase and gin seed cotton, and trade 
cotton through its commercial offices in Paris. Cotonchad faced serious difficulties during the 
price decline of 1985, which was further exacerbated by a drought during that year. 
Production declined from 60,000 in 1983/84 to 36,000 tons in 1984/85. It took the sector five 
years to return to earlier levels of output. 
However, financial stress of Cotonchad, the heavy taxation from the government, 
along with civil war and the war with Libya, imposed a heavy burden on the sector (Azam 
and Djimtoingar 2002). For example, prices paid to cotton growers fluctuated at the low level 
of CFAf 80 to 100 between 1983 and 1993 (see Table B4 in Appendix B). The 1994  
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devaluation provided temporary relief to the sector, as prices paid to growers increased 
gradually from CFAf 90 in 1993 to CFAf 195 in 1997 (when cotton output exceeded 100,000 
tons that year). However, the boom was short-lived, as world price declines along with 
mismanagement of the sector and heavy taxation forced Cotonchad to reduce the grower 
price to CFAf 160. 
In response to these developments, the government set up a Cotton Sector Reform 
Committee in 1999 to evaluate likely reform strategies. The primary concern of the 
Committee was improving the incomes of cotton farmers through liberalizing the sector along 
with improving the performance of producer organizations. In 2002, the oil-soap factory was 
privatized, but that was the only policy reform. The government, together with Cotonchad, 
organized a workshop in April 2004 in Ndjamena in order to find ways to improve the 
financial situation of Cotonchad and boost cotton production. However, undertaking deeper 
reforms was not placed high on the agenda. 
The momentum for reforms, which was not strong to begin with, has weakened even 
further following the country’s windfall revenue from crude oil; not surprisingly, the cotton 
reform agenda has been affected in two interrelated ways. First, crude oil has displaced cotton 
as the key source of income for the government. Consider, for example, that during 2007 the 
export earnings from cotton are expected to be less than US$ 70 million, just a fraction of oil 
revenue which is expected to reach $1.2 billion—$930 million from taxes and $250 million 
from royalty fees. Second, the increased activity in the crude oil sector has practically 
absorbed all capacity and energy by officials who would (and could) have been in charge of 
reforms in the cotton sector. 
 
Côte d’Ivoire: Courageous reform effort hampered by civil war
11 
 
Cotton, the third most important export crop after cocoa and coffee, accounted for about 3 
percent of Côte d’Ivoire’s agricultural exports in 2001-03. There are close to 300,000 cotton 
growers in Côte d’Ivoire, each cultivating an average cotton plot of a little more than a 
hectare. Most of Côte d’Ivoire’s cotton production is concentrated in the North of the 
country, an area under great stress due to the civil conflict. 
Cotton cultivation in Côte d’Ivoire was introduced in 1962 in the northern and central 
savannah regions of the country as means to diversify out of coffee and cocoa, the two key 
                                                 
11 For more on distortions to cotton and other products in Cote d’Ivoire, see Abbott (2007).  
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export crops at the time. During the first decade, CFDT was handling all aspects of the cotton 
sector; the performance of the sector, however, was not that impressive as it only managed to 
reach around 20,000 tons of lint. In 1973 all aspects of the sector were turned over to the 
newly created parastatal, CIDT (Compagnie Ivoirienne de Développement des Textiles), in 
which CFDT was a shareholder. The cotton sector grew considerably and by the mid-1990s it 
exceeded 150,000 tons of lint. Despite such growth, fueled mostly by the CFAf devaluation 
and high prices (which was common to all CFAf countries), it became apparent that the 
sector was characterized by numerous inefficiencies, especially at the ginning level. 
In October 1998, the government undertook an important policy reform decision to 
privatize most of the cotton industry. Specifically, CIDT was broken into five smaller 
companies, each operating in a designated zone (i.e., the companies were geographical 
monopsonies). The first company, CIDT Nouvelle, is active in the South of the country and is 
owned entirely by the government; it owns four ginneries with installed annual capacity of 
120,000 tons of seed cotton. The company recently expressed interest in selling 80 percent of 
its shares to cotton growers but the producer’s association has not been able to raise the 
necessary capital to purchase the company. The second company, Ivoire Coton, which 
operates in the North-West of the country, is a joint venture between the Aga-Khan group and 
the Swiss-based cotton merchant, Reinhart; it owns three ginning operations equal in capacity 
to that of CIDT Nouvelle. The third company, the LCCI (Compagnie Cotonnière Ivoirienne) 
is a subsidiary of the Swiss-based Aiglon group and is active in the North-East of the country; 
it owns four ginning operations (including a new one, reportedly the largest ginning operation 
in WCA) with capacity of 230,000 tons of cotton seed. The other two companies SICOSA 
and DOPA own one ginning operation each with capacity of 60,000 and 30,000 tons of seed 
cotton, respectively. 
In addition to the privatization of ginning, two new entities were introduced in the 
sector. First, the Autorité de régulation du coton et de l’anacarde (ARECA), which is a 
government-owned enterprise in charge of regulating the cotton and cashewnut industries. 
Second, the Interprofession de la filière coton (INTERCOTON), is an association with the 
mandate to bring together all cotton-related professional organizations. However, it appears 
that the division of roles between ARECA and INTERCOTON is not well defined. Finally, 
the ginners have formed the Association Professionnelle des sociétés cotonnières 
(APROCOT) whose role is to promote cooperation among ginners. 
The privatization efforts of Côte d’Ivoire’s cotton sector has been the most advanced 
in the sense that four new private companies were allowed to enter the sector while the  
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government only kept a portion of the ginning capacity with the intention of liquidating it. 
The performance of the sector, however, has been thwarted by the civil conflict, which 
practically isolated most of the cotton producing areas of the North. Problems include theft 
and destruction of property, difficulties in transporting cotton to the port of Abidjan, lack of 
banking system to facilitate transactions, and frequent interruptions to ginning due to lack of 
parts and power outages (Signo 2007). 
There are reports that substantial quantities of cotton marketed through neighboring 
Burkina Faso and Mali. It is unclear how much of the crop goes through these countries. 
While the average production of the last three seasons has been about two thirds of what it 
was during the second half of the 1990s, some of this reduction is due to the civil conflict. It 
is believed that more than 10 percent of the crop may be marketed through these countries 
(see Table B5) some estimates put the unrecorded exports up to one third of the crop, but this 
appears to be logistically impossible. Some diversion, however, certainly takes place since 
prices received by Ivorian cotton growers during the last two seasons have been the lowest 
among all WCA countries. For example, cotton growers in Burkina Faso received CFAf 
210/kg in 2004/05 and CFAf 175/kg in 2005/06. Similarily, in Mali they received and CFAf 
210/kg in 2004/05 and CFAf 168/kg in 2005/06. The corresponding prices for Côte d’Ivoire 
were CFAf 185/kg and CFAf 140/kg. 
 
Mali: Not willing to engage in reforms until … 
 
Cotton is Mali’s most important cash crop. During 2001-03 it contributed 30 percent to total 
merchandise exports and more than 6 percent to the country’s GDP. An estimated 300,000 
households depend on the crop, which implies that as much as one-third of Mali’s population 
is affected by the sector’s performance. The average cotton plot in Mali is 2.6 hectares. As is 
the case with other WCA countries, cotton is a rainfed crop and most of the land is prepared 
manually. Cotton is typically rotated with food crops such as millet, sorghum, maize, and 
groundnuts. 
Cotton was introduced in Mali during the late 1940s by CFDT, which continued its 
involvement even after independence in 1960. A national cotton company, CMDT 
(Compagnie Malienne pour le Développement du Textile), was formed in 1974 as a joint 
venture between the government (60 percent) and CFDT (40 percent). CMDT has played a 
key role in the ownership, management, and control of the various components in the supply 
chain, including the cotton oil-processing sector. It has also assumed responsibility for rural  
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development, particularly road maintenance and some extension services in the major cotton-
growing areas. In addition to CMDT, another organization, OHVN (Office de la Haute Vallee 
du Niger) has been involved in the cotton sector since 1970. OHVN was allocated a specific 
part of the country to operate and has responsibility for the promotion of all crops. It is 
involved in all cotton production activities but not in ginning. CMDT which currently owns 
and operates two ginneries in the OHVN zone is paid by the latter to carry out ginning. 
The first comprehensive review of the cotton sector was undertaken in 1989 and to a 
large degree the sector’s current institutional setting reflects that review.
12 The key steps 
taken in 1989, which were supported by the donor community, included financial autonomy 
of CMDT, introduction of minimum producer price, and establishment of a stabilization fund. 
CMDT’s weak management along with the 1999 decline of cotton prices resulted in a 
financial crisis. In response, CMDT set a low price for the 2000/01 season causing many 
growers to abandon cotton cultivation. Cotton output declined from 197,000 tons in 
1999/2000 to 102,000 tons in 2000/01 (see Table B6 in Appendix B). Faced with these 
difficulties, the government prepared a comprehensive restructuring plan (Lettre de Politique 
de Développement du Secteur Coton), which envisaged reforming CMDT’s institutional 
arrangements in order to restore the competitiveness of the sector and ultimately foster broad-
based growth. The poor financial shape of CMDT, however, has persisted. Between 1997 and 
2004, it generated profits only twice while the losses in 2005 alone amounted to some CFAf 
48 billion ($91 million). Yet, the government has publicly announced that it will not engage 
in any reform effort until 2008. 
 
Senegal: Cotton is too small to matter
13 
 
Senegal’s cotton sector is very small compared to other sectors of the economy. It is also the 
smallest WCA cotton producer (excluding Central Africa Republic, Guinea, and Niger.) 
During 2001-03, the sector contributed 2 percent to merchandize exports and 0.3 percent to 
the country’s GDP. Cotton export earnings during this period averaged a little over $20 
million. An estimated 70,000 households are involved in cotton production, cultivating an 
average cotton plot of less than a hectare. 
                                                 
12 Developments in the Malian cotton sector were also influenced by an uprising by cotton farmers in the early 
1990s (Bingen 1998). 
13 For more on distortions to cotton and other products in Senegal, see Masters (2007).  
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Cotton was introduced in Senegal after independence. Production increased to 15,000 
tons of lint during the mid-1970s and has remained at that level since then. All marketing and 
trade aspects of the sector were handled by SODEFITEX (Société de Dèveloppement des 
Fibres Textiles), a government-owned parastatal. In November 2003, DAGRIS became the 
majority shareholder of SOEDFITEX (51 percent). Cotton producers acquired 30 percent of 
the shares, while the government retained 10 percent. Local spinners received the remaining 
shares. 
Cotton is ginned at SODEFITEX’s five operations. Although it is too early to assess 
the reforms, it is noteworthy to note that during the past 4 seasons, Senegal’s cotton output 
averaged 19,000 tons of lint, the highest average of any 4-year period since 1970 (see Table 
B7). Senegal also managed to pay cotton growers the second highest average real price (after 
Benin) during 1998-2005. 
 
Togo: A lot of problems lately … 
 
Cotton is Togo’s second largest primary commodity export after phosphate fertilizer. It 
contributed 16 percent to export earnings and 4.2 percent to GDP in 2001-03. Togo’s cotton 
production is in the same range as that of Chad; during 2001-03 it averaged 68,000 tons. Its 
yields, however, are much higher than in Chad but lower than in Benin, Burkina Faso, and 
Mali. 
Cotton was introduced in Togo relatively recently. For example, during the early 
1970s, cotton production averaged only 2,000 to 3,000 tons. In 1974, the state-owned 
company SOTOCO (Société Togolaise de Coton) begun its operations by handling most of 
the input supply and marketing activities as well as research, extension and maintenance of 
the road network (World Bank 1988). Production increased significantly after the 1980s, and 
exceeded 50,000 tons following the 1994 devaluation (see Table B8 in Appendix B). 
Togo’s cotton sector differs from the other WCA countries in that following the 
purchase of cotton half of the crop is sold to three private ginneries at a price equal to the 
price paid to the producers plus marketing and transportation costs. The share of cotton 
delivered to each ginnery is fixed, set as a proportion to its respective ginning capacity. While 
Togo’s cotton sector was affected by the late-1990s decline in prices, SOTOCO responded 
quickly by cutting down operating costs and reducing the prices paid to growers. This was the 
only feasible alternative since there is no stabilization fund in place to cover losses, nor the 
government’s tight financial situation allowed any budgetary support (IMF 2003). However,  
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the recent price declines appear to have derailed the sector’s performance. During 2005/06, 
cotton production dropped to 28,000 tons, less than half of the decade’s average. 
 
 
Estimating the distortions to cotton sector incentives 
 
The task of quantifying the distortions to cotton sector incentives contains elements of both 
simplicity and complexity. The simple part reflects the fact that there is a well-defined world 
price indicator, the A Index, one component of which is WCA cotton (see Appendix A). 
Since the price of WCA cotton tracks the A Index very closely, one can use it as the world 
price benchmark.
14 Second, all cotton companies pay panterritorial and panseasonal prices, 
thus making it is easy to calculate the gap between the world price and prices received by 
growers. Third, almost all cotton is exported and hence there is no need to deal with domestic 
marketing distortion issues. Fourth, most of the value of cotton comes from cotton lint, so 
calculating the distortion to cotton lint, to a large extent, captures the distortions in the entire 
cotton market. Lastly, the rate of conversion (i.e., the ginning ratio) between the farm product 
(seed cotton) and the internationally traded commodity (cotton lint) is a well-known 
parameter and very similar across countries and years. 
However, there are a number of reasons that make quantification of the distortions a 
complex task. First, in addition to explicit taxation, the governments would ‘use’ the profits 
from the cotton companies for a number of other activities with the financial transactions not 
being explicitly documented. Second, in periods of low prices when the national cotton 
companies incurred losses, the governments would rescue them through budgetary transfers. 
Third, and most importantly, there are numerous inefficiencies inherent in the value chain—
especially ginning—making it difficult to distinguish between inefficiencies and taxation. 
Fourth, often the cotton companies would transfer resources to producers through the 
provision of public services, such construction and maintenance of rural roads, again very 
difficult to quantify. 
The rest of this section examines distortions to incentives from two different 
perspectives. First, with the use of an econometric model it estimates the degree to which 
world price movements influence the domestic price determination mechanism. Second, it 
                                                 
14 In a study that examined the comovement of the various components of the A Index as well as the 
comovement between the A Index and its components, Baffes and Ajwad (2001) found that the WCA cotton 
prices tracked the A Index very closely.  
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calculates the Nominal Rate of Assistance (NRA) for all countries and years by taking into 
account international and domestic transportation costs as well as ginning costs. 
 
Virtual absence of world price signal pass-through … 
 
In order to estimate the degree to which the cotton pricing mechanism of the eight countries 
took into consideration world price movements, a standard OLS regression was estimated—




d/It) = μ + β1log(Pt




d denotes the price received by cotton growers (in nominal terms), It denotes the GDP 
deflator (a measure of inflation), Pt
w is the nominal world price of cotton (in dollar terms), Rt 
is the bilateral CFAf/$ nominal exchange rate, and t denotes time trend; μ, β1, and β2 are 
parameters to be estrimated while εt is the error term. A coefficient of β1 close to unity would 
imply full transmission of world price movements to domestic prices while a coefficient 
equal to zero will imply no comovement at all. If β2 is significantly different from zero, it 
whould imply that, accounting for world price movements, domestic prices have followed an 
increasing (β2>0) or declining (β2<0) trend. 
Stationarity results for all variables in included in (1) as well as two additional 
specifications described below are reported in Table 4.
15 The first two columns report 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test results without and with trend (Dickey and Fuller 
1979) while the last two columns report the corresponding Phillips-Perron statistics (Phillips 
and Perron 1988). With the exception of the nominal A Index when expressed in US$, 
log(Pt
w), and on a few occasions the deflated A Index expressed in CFAf, log(Pt
wRt/It), all 
variables are non-stationary according to all four unit root statistics. One key policy 
conclusion from the results of Table 4 is that the non-stationarity of the nominal A Index 
expressed in CFAf implies that its first and second moments of its distribution do not exist. 
Because this is the variable policy makers are attempting to stabilize, its non-stationarity 
                                                 
15 Note that apart from the exchange rate, which is the same in all countries and appears in only Benin, 
stationarity statistics for the A Index are reported for all countries because the GDP deflators and the ginning 
ratios employed to convert the A Index from lint to seed equivalent are different in each country.  
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implies any stabilization effort will fail since the variable will always tend to drift apart for 
long periods away from any perceived mean. 
Results of (1) for each country are reported in the upper panel of Table 4. The results 
indicate that in only two countries the pricing mechanism took into account world price 
conditions and this is quite limited: Cameroon, with a price transmission elasticity of 0.24 
(significant at the 5 percent level) and Senegal, with an elasticity of 0.14 (significant at the 10 
percent level). However, given that the unit root test for Senegal reject stationarity of the 
error term, only the Cameroon elasticity can be viewed as different from zero. 
Alternatively, (1) can be reparameterized by relaxing the homogeneity assumption for 
inflation as follows: 
 
log(Pt
d) = μ + β1log(Pt
wRt) + β2log(It) + β3t + εt.    
 (2) 
 
Note that if β1 = β2 -1, (2) collapses to (1). Results from (2) are reported in the middle panels 
of Table 5. These results differ from equation (1) in that in addition to Cameroon and 
Senegal, which still retain the significant price effect, Côte d’Ivoire has a price coefficient of 
0.21, which is significant at 10 percent level. As expected, in all cases the inflation measure is 
significant at the 1 percent level. The size of the coefficient, however, varies from a low of 
0.41 in Burkina Faso to a high of 1.34 in Cameroon. 
Further reparameterizing (2) by relaxing the homogeneity assumption between world 
price and exchange rate gives: 
 
log(Pt
d) = μ + β1log(Pt
w) + β2log(Rt) + β3log(It) + β4t + εt.  
 (3) 
 
Again, (3) collapses to (1) when β1 = β2 = β3 -1. Under the price/exchange rate homogeneity 
assumption, world price changes and exchange rate movements are expected to have identical 
affect on prices received by cotton growers. That is, a CFAf/$ depreciation or a decline in the 
world price of cotton would have the same effect on Pt
d. The lower panel of Table 5 reports 
results consistent with regression (3). In terms of the price effect, the results suggest that 
apart from the marginally significant parameter estimate of Cameroon (at the 10 percent 
level) none of the other parameters were significantly different from zero, indicating that  
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inflation has been the driving force in the few cases of the marginally significant price 
coefficients found earlier. 
Not surprisingly, the inflation parameter estimate was significantly different from 
zero in all cases with the respective estimate ranging from a low of 0.49 in Burkina Faso to a 
high of 1.38 in Cameroon—the estimates of Benin and Côte d’Ivoire were remarkably close 
to unity. The time trend coefficient was significantly different from zero (at the 5 percent 
level) in four cases, in three of which it was positive (Burkina Faso, Mali, and Senegal) and 
one negative (Cameroon). The results on time trend were consistent throughout the three 
specifications. 
The econometric evidence suggests that the price-setting mechanisms have largely 
ignored world market signals. It is also noteworthy to mention that in the cases where the 
domestic/world price linkage was somewhat significant (Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, and 
Senegal), cotton is of lesser importance to the economies compared to the remaining five 
countries. Hence, one may even conclude that in the five countries with zero transmission 
elasticities cotton is too important to be left to market forces. 
In addition to the pass-through, the price variability of the prices that the farmers 
received and the prices that they would have faced was also calculated as follows: 
 
Z = [Σt(Pt – Pt-1)
2/(n – 1)]
1/2,       
 (4) 
 
where Pt and Pt-1 denote current and lagged price level while n (= 35) is the number of 
observations. The choice of the specific measure of price variability reflected the fact that 
prices are non-stationary and hence measures such as standard deviation may give misleading 
results. 
Results of Z-statistic are given in the fourth panel of Table 6. Note that although there 
is a single world price, the different values among the eight countries reflect the adjustment 
by the domestic GDP deflator. As argued earlier (and consistent with the virtual absence of 
comovement between domestic and world price) the results indicate that the pricing 
mechanisms in all countries have reduced world price variability by factors between five and 
seven, i.e., world prices have been, on average, six times more volatile than domestic prices. 
 




The main focus of the present study’s methodology (Anderson et al. 2008) is on government-
imposed distortions that create a gap between domestic prices and what they would be under 
free markets. More specifically, this study computes an NRA for farmers including an 
adjustment for direct interventions on tradable inputs (border protection on fertilizers) and on 
non-tradable inputs (credit subsidies to farmers).  
Quantifying the distortions requires three calculations and subsequent adjustments to 
the world price of cotton. First, the fob-cif costs are calculated, which are common to all 
WCA countries. Second, the inland transportation costs are calculated, which are different for 
each country (higher for land-locked countries and lower for countries with sea-port access). 
Third, the ginning costs (including farm-to-ginning transport costs) are calculated. 
The A Index adjustment by the cif-to-fob costs consists of two components: 
international freight rates, i.e., costs from the export port to the final destination port, and 
marketing charges. Both of these cost components are common to all countries since 
international freight rates are very similar regardless of the port of origin (see Table B9, 
Appendix B). The second component of cif-to-fob costs is marketing charges. These are 
standard charges across the industry, representing 3 percent of the A Index until 2002/03 and 
2.6 percent since then. These two costs account for an average of 8 percent of the A Index 
(see last column of Table B9). 
Domestic transport costs for all eight countries are reported in Table B10. As 
expected, there are substantial differences between landlocked countries and countries with 
access to sea ports. Consider, for example, that in 2005/06 the costs of transporting one 
kilogram of cotton lint from Chad to the port of Duala (Cameroon) was CFAf 100; it was less 
than half of that for Benin, Senegal, and Togo, which have easier access to sea ports. 
Ginning costs are reported in Table B9 (third column). They are averages of all eight 
countries and they range between CFAf 50/kg of cotton lint in the early 1970s to more than 
CFAf 200/kg after the mid-1990s. These figures represent the costs as they are reported in the 
financial statements of the cotton companies and consequently do not reflect the true costs of 
ginning, since the ginning operations are characterized by numerous inefficiencies. In order 
to obtain the true costs of ginning they must be adjusted downwards. Analysis performed 
during 2005, found that the actual ginning costs during that year were 18 percent lower than 
what the cotton companies reported.
16 However, it is believed that in earlier years, the true 
                                                 
16 Personal communication with Gerald Estùr (March 16, 2007).  
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ginning costs were much lower, since the companies would finance activities of public-good 
(e.g., road maintenance). Hence, the adjustment factor used to estimate the actual ginning 
costs was 25 percent (i.e. it is assumed that ginning costs are 25 percent lower than what it is 
reported in the third column of Table B9). 











D denotes the price received by cotton growers as before, Pt
W denotes the A Index; 
Ct
F denotes freight rates and marketing charges; Rt denotes the CFAf/$ bilateral exchange 
rate (as before), March to July average, consistent with the WCA cotton marketing season; 
Ct
I denotes inland transport costs; and Ct
G denotes actual ginning costs (including farm-to-
ginnery transport costs). 
To illustrate, the calculation of the NRA for Benin (1970/71 season) is given in what 
follows (also outlined in the Table 6). The March-July (marketing period) 1971 average of 
the A Index was $ 0.69/kg of cotton lint (Table B9, first column). Freight rates and marketing 
costs were 8.1 percent of the A Index (Table B9, last column) hence the fob value of the A 
Index was $ 0.63/kg of lint (i.e. 91.9 percent of $ 0.69). At an exchange rate of 276 CFAf/$ 
(Table B9, second column), the fob price of cotton lint becomes CFAf 174/kg. Inland 
transport costs for lint were CFAf 8/kg (Table B10, first column), so the ex-gin price of lint 
becomes CFAf 166/kg. Ginning and farm-to-ginnery transport costs for lint were CFAf 38/kg 
(Table B9, third column), so the farmgate price of cotton lint becomes CFAf 128/kg. 
Applying the 38.1percent ginning outturn ratio (Table B1, fourth column) gives a farmgate 
cotton seed price of CFAf 49/kg. Comparing that to the CFAf 34/kg paid to cotton growers 
(Table B1, fourth column), gives a share of 70 percent or, equivalently, an NRA of -30 
percent. Calculating these values for 1970/71 to 1974/75 and averaging them gives the -44 
percent reported in the upper left cell of Table 8. 
The calculation of the NRA presented here is consistent with the distortion taking 
place at farmgate level (i.e., production tax), a specification chosen on the basis that the 
cotton companies become the owners of seed cotton at farmgate level. Alternatively, one 
could have worked backwards, i.e. from farmgate to fob as follows: Adjust the CFAf 34/kg 
by the ginning ratio which gives CFAf 89/kg of lint. To that add ginning costs (CFAf 38/kg) 
and domestic transport costs (CFAf 8/kg), which gives an adjusted fob prices of CFAf 135/kg  
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of lint. That is equivalent to an NRA of -25 percent, calculated as 100*(135/179-1). This 
calculation would be consistent with an export tax (or subsidy if it were positive). 
Results of distortions to incentives for all eight countries are reported in Table 6. 
Specifically, the first three panels give the period averages for all eight countries on the 
domestic value of the A Index, price received by producers (both in constant 2000 terms), 
and producer’s share. The results confirm the earlier assertion that producers’ share has been 
low during the first (1970-84) and third (1994-97) periods and much higher during the second 
(1985-93) and fourth (1998-2005) period. 
The lower two panels of Table 6 report the NRA when all costs are taken into 
consideration (i.e., freight rates and inland transport costs as well as ginning costs).
17 
Specifically, the penultimate panel reports NRAs based on the reported ginning costs while 
the lower panel reports NRAs based on the assumed actual (i.e., “discounted”) ginning costs. 
A value of 100 indicates no taxation or subsidization while values of less (more) than 100 
indicate taxation (subsidization). In a sense, the differences between the values reported in 
the penultimate and bottom panels of Table 5 may be viewed as the “inefficiency” factor. 
Based on the discounted ginning costs, the WCA cotton growers have been taxed, on 
average, by 47 percent during 1970-84 and 42 percent during 1994-97. However, they have 
incurred a small tax of eight and five percent during 1985-93 and 1998-2005, respectively. 
The heaviest taxation has taken place in Mali, where during the first and third period farmers 
were taxed at 57 and 48 percent, respectively. On the contrary, the lowest taxation has taken 
place in Cameroon with rates of 39 and 34 percent during these two periods. It is also 
noteworthy to mention that the high taxation during the first and third periods was consistent 
across all eight countries as was the case with the low taxation in the third and fourth periods, 
with the exception of Cameroon, which was subsidized in the second period. 
Lastly, Table 8 reports results based on the same NRAs with the value of zero (instead 
of 100) indicating no taxation or subsidization (these results are also based on 5-year 
averages). The region averages are also depicted in Figure 12. 
 
 
Concluding remarks and limitations 
 
                                                 
17 During the second and fourth period where the average NRA appears to be small, there have been years of 
both taxation and subsidization so the period average NRA underestimates the degree of distortions.  
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This paper reviewed the cotton sector policies and examined the nature and degree of 
distortions to incentives in eight WCA countries, namely, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, 
Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Senegal and Togo. These countries account for almost all WCA 
cotton output, roughly equivalent to 3.5 percent of global production. The period under 
consideration spans 1970 to 2005. 
A number of conclusions emerge from the analysis of this paper. The pricing schemes 
of the cotton companies have induced remarkable price stability. However, regressions of the 
price received by cotton growers on the world price of cotton indicated that there is virtually 
no comovement between these two prices, meaning that the price decision making process 
did not take into account world price signals. 
This paper assumed that during 1970-2005, there have been four sub-periods 
regarding incentives to cotton growers with similar but also distinct characteristics. First, 
during 1970-84 the cotton sectors were heavily taxed at an average rate of 47 percent (the 
highest rate of taxation was in Mali, 57 percent while the lowest was in Cote d’Ivoire, 37 
percent). During the second period, there was a low taxation incident, on average eight 
percent (which also includes subsidization in Cameroon). During this period the cotton 
companies faced severe financial difficulties and they had to be rescued repeatedly through 
budgetary support measures. In the third period, which begins with the devaluation of the 
CFAf in 1994 and ends with the beginning of the price decline in 1997, the sectors were 
taxed, on average, by 42 percent. During the last period, 1998 to present (which in many 
ways is a mirror image of the 1985-93 period), cotton growers were taxed, on average, at five 
percent. Note that the last period was characterized by low world prices, the CFAf being 
(most likely) overvalued, and most cotton companies facing financial difficulties. 
One of the limitations of this paper is that it did not address exchange rate 
misalignment. Indeed, as was the case during the early 1990s, it appears that the CFAf is 
currently overvalued imposing an implicit taxation to the cotton sector. The reason the issue 
was not covered here reflects the lack of consistent overvaluation indices. Of the three 
choices at hand, none appeared to be satisfactory. First, the IMF real effective exchange rate 
index covers only three countries while it has indexed it to 2000, effectively implying that 
misalignment in that year was zero. Second, using the PPP approach would require 
assumption about a year in which the misalignment would have been zero. Third, some recent 
World Bank WCA misalignment estimates were not deemed adequate to address the 
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Box 1: The CFA Franc and Cotton in WCA 
 
The CFA Franc (CFAf) is the common currency of 14 West and Central African countries comprising 
two groups, members of the Franc Zone. One group includes Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, 
Guinea Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo which form the West African Economic and 
Monetary Union (WAEMU) and whose common central bank is the Central Bank of West African 
States (BCEAO). The other group includes Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, Gabon, 
Equatorial Guinea, and Chad which form the Central Africa Economic and Monetary Community 
(CEMAC) and whose common central bank is the Bank of Central African States (BEAC). 
The CFAf was created in 1945, when France ratified the Bretton Woods agreement. At that 
time, the CFAf was the acronym for Franc of the French Colonies of Africa (Franc des Colonies 
Françaises d'Afrique). In 1958, it became Franc of the French Community of Africa (Franc de la 
Communauté Française d'Afrique). Today it means Franc of the African Financial Community (Franc 
de la Communauté Financière d'Afrique) for WAEMU members and Franc of Financial Cooperation 
in Central Africa (Franc de la Coopération Financière en Afrique Centrale) for CEMAC members. 
Initially, convertibility with the French Franc (FF) was set at 0.59 CFAf/FF, becoming 0.50 CFAf/FF 
after the 1948 devaluation of the French Franc. In 1958 two zeros were added to the existing 
denomination, making it 50 CFAf/FF. 
During the early 1990s, it had become increasingly apparent that the CFAf was overvalued. 
The degree of overvaluation, however, differed markedly among WCA countries. Baffes, Elbadawi, 
and O’Connell (1999, p. 450-51), for example, based on a single equation framework estimated that 
during the early 1990s, the CFAf was overvalued more than 30 percent in Côte d’Ivoire while it was 
roughly in equilibrium in Burkina Faso. Devarajan (1999, p. 370), based on a simple general 
equilibrium model, concluded that the CFAf overvaluation in 1993 (one year prior to the devaluation) 
was: Cameroon (78 percent), Togo (52 percent), Mali (39 percent), Côte d’Ivoire (36 percent), 
Senegal (22 percent), Burkina Faso (9 percent), Benin (3 percent), and Chad (-19 percent, i.e., 
undervalued). For an extensive discussion of issues surrounding the CFAf overvaluation see Hinkle 
and Montiel (1999). In January 1994 the CFAf was re-pegged to the French Franc at 100 CFAf/FF 
and in 1999 it was linked to the euro at 656 CFAf/€, keeping its former parity with the FF. 
The 1994 adjustment to the CFAf, which (temporarily) restored the currency equilibrium in 
most WCA countries, coupled with the cotton price increases of the mid-1990s induced considerable 
supply response in the cotton sectors of most WCA countries. For example, regional cotton 
production increased from 573,000 tons in 1993/94 (the year prior to devaluation) to 921,000 tons in 
just four years. For the nine years that followed, however, cotton output remained, for the most part, 
stagnant at 900,000 tons. Such stagnation along with the financial difficulties of the cotton companies 
may have to do, in part, with the (likely) overvalued CFAf. This should not be surprising. During 
2005/06 the US$ A Index average was roughly the same as in 2000/01. However, during the same 
period the CFAf appreciated from 731 CFAf/$ to 535 CFAf/$, effectively reducing the world price of 
cotton in CFAf terms by 37 percent.  
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Table 1. Key institutions involved in the cotton industries of WCA countries 
Institution/Entity  Status  Main Functions And Responsibilities 
FRANCE     
DAGRIS (Développement des Agro-
Industries du Sud) 
Government  Known as CFDT (Compagnie Française de 
Développement des Fibres Textiles) prior to 2001, it 
pioneered the cotton sectors in most WCA 
countries. 
COPACO (Compagnie Cotonnière)  Subsidiary of 
DAGRIS 
Used to trade most of WCA cotton; it currently 
trades about 5 percent of WCA cotton. 
CIRAD (Centre de Cooperation 
Internationale en Recherche 
Agronomique pour le 
Développement) 
Government  French Agricultural Research Institute with 
numerous research programs including activities 
responsible for the development of cotton varieties 
and input packages for WCA countries. 
AFD (Agence Française de 
Développement) 
Government  Development Agency of France financing projects 
in Francophone countries. 
BENIN     
SONAPRA (Société Nationale pour 
la Promotion Agricole) 
Parastatal  The cotton company of Benin; it used to be 
responsible for all aspects of the industry. Now it 
has relinquished control of most of its activities to 
other entities (see below). 
GAGIA (Coopérative d’Approvision-
nement et de Gestion des Intrants 
Agricoles) 
Private  It was formed in 1998, a cooperative belonging to 
the Regional Producers unions. It represents the 
interests of the cotton companies. 
APEB (l’Association Professionnelle 
des Egreineurs du Bénin) 
Private  It was created in 1999 with the key responsibility to 
coordinate activities among ginneries. 
AIC (l’Association 
Interprofessionnelle du Coton) 
Private  It was established in 1999 in order manage supply 
chain-related functions. 
CSPR (Centrale de Sécurisation des 
paiements et de Recouvrement) 
Private  Created in 2000 with the mandate to recover debts 
from grower, deliver cotton to ginners, and make 
payments to growers. 
BURKINA FASO     
SOFITEX (La Société Burkinabè des 
Fibres et Textiles) 
Parastatal  The cotton company of Burkina Faso, with 
ownership, 36 percent by the government, 30 
percent by UNPCB (see below) and 34 percent 
DAGRIS. 
UNPCB (Union Nationale des 
Producteurs de Coton du Burkina 
Faso) 
Private  Producer organization, which has a strong say on 
SOFITEX’s decisions such as prices received by 
growers, selling prices of inputs, and management 
of the research program. 
FASO COTON  Private  A private cotton company introduced in 2004, with 
an 8-year exclusivity right in the Central cotton 
zone. 
SOCOMA (Société Cotonnière du 
Gourma) 
Private  A private cotton company introduced in 2004, with 
an 8-year exclusivity right in the Eastern cotton 
zone. 
AIC (Association 
interprofessionnelle du cotton) 
Private  An APEX organization whose key mission is to 
enforce industry-level agreements regarding the 
management of the supply chain such as price 
setting and to coordinate and supervise common 




Table 1 cont. Key institutions involved in the cotton industries of WCA countries 
Institution/Entity  Status  Main Functions And Responsibilities 
CAMEROON     
SODECOTON (Société de 
Développement du Coton du 
Cameroun) 
Parastatal  The cotton company of Cameroon; it is owned by 
the government (59 percent), DAGRIS (30 percent), 
and a private local company (11 percent). 
OPCC (Organisation des 
Producteurs de Coton du Cameroun) 
Private  Umbrella organization of cotton producer groups, 
established in 2000. 
CHAD     
Cotonchad Parastatal  The cotton company of Chad, in charge all 
marketing and trade aspects of the industry, 
including managing direct sales through its Paris-
based office. 
CÔTE D’IVOIRE     
CIDT (La Compagnie Ivoirienne de 
Développement des Textiles) 
Parastatal  The cotton company of Côte d’Ivoire that handled 
all marketing and trade aspects of the industry; it is 
called CIDT Nouvelle since 1998 (owns four 
ginneries). 
Ivoire Coton  Private  It is a joint venture between the Aga-Khan group 
and the Swiss-based merchant, Reinhart, operates in 
the North-West of the country (owns three 
ginneries). 
LCCI (La Compagnie Cotonnière 
Ivoirienne) 
Private  A subsidiary of the Swiss-based Aiglon group that 
operates in the North-East of the country (owns four 
ginneries). 
SICOSA (Société Industrielle 
Cotonnière des Savanes) 
Private  Owned by a producer’s association; it operates one 
ginnery. 
DOPA (Département des Opérations 
Agro-industrielles) 
Private  A partnership among a group of spinners; it 
operates one ginnery. 
APROCOT (Association 
professionnelle des sociétés 
cotonnières) 
Private  An association whose role is to promote 
cooperation among ginners. 
ARECA (Autorité de régulation du 
coton et de l’anacarde), 
Government  In charge of regulating the cotton and cashewnut 
industries. 
INTERCOTON (Interprofession de la 
filière coton),  
Government  Its mandate is to bring together all cotton-related 
professional organizations. 
MALI     
CMDT (Compagnie Malienne pour 
le Développement du Textile) 
Parastatal  The cotton company of Mali, handling almost all 
marketing and trade aspects of the cotton industry. 
OHVN (Office de la Haute Vallee du 
Niger) 
  Company involved in the promotion of many crops, 
including cotton. It is involved in cotton production 
(not ginning) in a specific part of the country.  
SENEGAL     
SODEFITEX (Société de 
Dèveloppement des Fibres Textiles) 
Parastatal  The cotton company of Senegal, which used to 
handle all aspects of marketing and trade until 
2002, when majority shareholding was transferred 
to DAGRIS. 
TOGO     
SOTOCO (Société Togolaise de 
Coton) 
Parastatal  The cotton company of Togo, handling all 
production and marketing activities of the industry, 
except ginning half of the cotton crop, which is 
done in three private ginneries. 
 
Source: Various country sources. Benin Faso  Cameroon  Chad  d’Ivoire  Mali 
COUNTRY-LEVEL STATISTICS             
Per  capita  GDP  (constant  2000  $)  322 241 709 192 593 231 
Per capita GNI (current PPP $)  1,023  1,087  1,913  987  1,435  893 
Population  (million)  7.7 12.0 15.5  8.8 17.3  6.2 
Rural  population  (%  of  total)  56 83 49 75 56 68 
Merchandise exports ($ million)  454  263  1,932  325  5,000  842 
COTTON-RELATED STATISTICS             
Value of cotton exports ($ million)  168  201  111  64  146  253 
Cotton’s export share (%)  36.9  76.6  5.7  19.7  2.9  30.0 
Cotton’s  contribution  to  GDP  (%)  4.9 5.0 0.8 2.6 1.0 6.2 
Cotton production (000 tons, lint)  152  177  99  59  139  225 
Cotton  area  (000  hectares)  331 408 200 277 253 510 
Cotton  yields  (kg/hectare,  lint)  459 435 498 213 532 439 
Grower  price  (CFAf/kg,  seed  cotton)  202 190 186 162 190 193 
Average  cotton  plot  (hectares)  1.0 1.9 0.7 1.4 1.3 2.6 
Households  in  cotton  production  (000) 325 210 300 200 200 300 
 
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization (FAOSTAT), World Bank (World Development Indicators), IMF 
(International Financial Statistics), various country sources, and author’s calculations.  
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Table 3. Production, area and yield growth decomposition, WCA countries, 1980 to 
2005 
  μ  β  ρ Adj-R
2  DW ADF  PP 
BENIN               
Production    0.22 
(0.52) 






0.46 -1.77  -1.72 
Area    1.51*** 
(4.40) 






0.43 -0.68  -0.81 
Yield    5.62*** 
(26.1) 
  0.01* 
(1.96) 




1.11 -4.97***  -4.98*** 
BURKINA FASO             
Production    1.45*** 
(7.59) 
  0.09*** 
(15.2) 




0.72 -2.09  -2.09 
Area    2.58*** 
(16.0) 
  0.08*** 
(16.8) 




0.84 -3.05**  -2.50 
Yield    5.87*** 
(49.1) 
  0.01* 
(2.00) 




1.43 -3.87***  -3.79*** 
CAMEROON               
Production    2.41*** 
(19.0) 
  0.05*** 
(13.5) 




1.75 -4.15***  -4.15*** 
Area    3.00*** 
(26.6) 
  0.06*** 
(16.3) 




1.00 -2.74*  -2.89* 








2.14 -5.28***  -5.29*** 
CHAD               
Production    2.96*** 
(13.4) 
  0.03*** 
(4.78) 




1.59 -3.95***  -3.94*** 
Area    4.22*** 
(28.1) 
  0.03*** 
(7.76) 




1.37 -3.83***  -3.82*** 








1.37 -4.25***  -4.25*** 
CÔTE D’IVOIRE             










1.48 -3.77***  -3.73*** 










1.05 -2.65*  -2.86* 









1.78 -4.47***  -4.49*** 
Continued next page  
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Table 3 cont. Production, area and yield growth decomposition, WCA countries, 1980 to 
2005 
 
  μ  β  ρ Adj-R
2  DW ADF  PP 
MALI               
Production 









1.66 -4.07***  -4.09*** 
Area 









1.82 -4.49***  -4.49*** 








0.63 -1.05  -3.67** 
SENEGAL             
Production    2.51*** 
(7.59) 
  0.00 
(0.33) 




1.17 -3.46***  -3.46*** 
Area    3.45*** 
(13.9) 
  0.00 
(0.62) 




1.35 -3.42**  -3.42** 








1.62 -4.31***  -4.32*** 
TOGO               
Production 









0.68 -1.41  -1.26 
Area 









0.83 -1.63  -1.62 








0.80 -2.50  -2.40 
WCA               
Production    4.25*** 
(34.8) 
  0.06*** 
(17.1) 




0.95 -2.71*  -2.63* 
Area    5.15*** 
(55.5) 
  0.06*** 
(22.5) 




1.19 -3.05**  -3.04** 
Yield    6.01*** 
(81.1) 
  0.00 
(0.67) 




0.99 -3.87***  -4.62*** 
WORLD               
Production 









1.64 -2.31  -4.11*** 
Area    10.4*** 
(226.3) 
  0.00 
(0.42) 




1.55 -5.00***  -4.27*** 
Yield 









1.00 -2.02  -3.37*** 
 
Notes: The growth rate has been calculated as ρ = exp(β)-1 from the following regressions: log(Xt) = μ + βt + εt, 
where Xt refers to production, area, or yield, t is time trend, while εt denotes the error term (absolute t-ratios in 
parentheses); μ and β denote parameters to be estimated. DW, ADF, and PP denote the Durbin-Watson, 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller, and Phillips-Perron statistics, which complement the conventional statistics in 
assessing the performance of the models. Asterisks correspond to significance levels of 1% (***), 5% (**), and 
10% (*). 
Source: Authors calculations  
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Table 4. Stationarity statistics, WCA countries 
 
 ADF    PP 
  w/o trend  w/ trend    w/o trend  w/ trend 
BENIN         
log(Pt
d/It) -2.43  -2.50  -2.43  -2.52 
log(Pt
wRt/It) -2.32  -4.09**  -2.12  -4.11** 
log(Pt
d) -1.50  -3.19  -1.50  -1.59 
log(Pt
wRt) -2.40  -3.11  -2.40  -3.13 
log(It) -1.70  -3.11  -1.49  -1.67 
log(Pt
w) -3.98***  -3.67**  -4.04***  -3.66** 
log(Rt) -1.05  -2.36  -1.16  -2.50 
BURKINA FASO       
log(Pt
d/It) -2.57  -2.88  -2.55  -2.87 
log(Pt
wRt/It) -3.06**  -3.75**  -3.01**  -3.71** 
log(Pt
d) -1.26  -2.08  -1.27  -2.18 
log(Pt
wRt) -2.38  -2.83  -2.38  -3.03 
log(It) -2.41  -1.22  -2.14  -1.36 
log(Pt
w) -3.95***  -3.59**  -4.05***  -3.58** 
CHAD       
log(Pt
d/It) -2.81*  -2.54  -2.25  -2.22 
log(Pt
wRt/It) -3.28***  -3.81**  -3.23**  -3.83** 
log(Pt
d) -2.04  -2.39  -1.76  -1.51 
log(Pt
wRt) -2.40  -2.89  -2.40  -3.08 
log(It) -1.26  -2.30  -1.31  -2.37 
log(Pt
w) -4.13***  -3.81**  -4.22***  -3.83** 
CÔTE D’IVOIRE       
log(Pt
d/It) -2.19  -2.88  -2.20  -2.83 
log(Pt
wRt/It) -1.97  -4.10**  -1.66  -4.08** 
log(Pt
d) -2.27  -3.29*  -2.05  -1.51 
log(Pt
wRt) -2.46  -2.83  -2.44  -2.94 
log(It) -1.72  -2.53  -1.89  -2.35 
log(Pt
w) -3.81***  -3.51*  -3.84***  -3.52* 
Continued next page  
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Table 4 cont. Stationarity statistics, WCA countries 
 
 ADF    PP 
  w/o trend  w/ trend    w/o trend  w/ trend 
CAMEROON         
log(Pt
d/It) -2.19  -2.88  -2.20  -2.83 
log(Pt
wRt/It) -2.34  -3.41*  -2.33  -3.45* 
log(Pt
d) -2.23  -1.50  -2.23  -1.54 
log(Pt
wRt) -2.43  -2.96  -2.49  -3.02 
log(It) -1.72  -2.52  -1.89 -2.35 
log(Pt
w) -3.88*** -3.58**  -3.95***  -3.59** 
MALI       
log(Pt
d/It) -2.01  -1.88  -4.73***  -4.75*** 
log(Pt
wRt/It) -2.02  -3.72**  -1.96  -3.73** 
log(Pt
d) -1.55  -2.09  -1.63  -1.82 
log(Pt
wRt) -2.38  -2.89  -2.38  -3.00 
log(It) -2.00  -1.75  -1.86 -1.19 
log(Pt
w) -3.83*** -3.52*  -3.84***  -3.47** 
SENEGAL       
log(Pt
d/It) -2.23  -2.24  -2.19  -2.20 
log(Pt
wRt/It) -2.54  -3.43*  -2.49  -3.48* 
log(Pt
d) -1.65  -2.12  -2.07  -2.18 
log(Pt
wRt) -2.40  -2.90  -2.39  -2.97 
log(It) -2.52  -0.38  -2.49 -0.39 
log(Pt
w) -4.06*** -3.68**  -4.17***  -3.67** 
TOGO       
log(Pt
d/It) -2.67*  -2.77  -2.68*  -2.80 
log(Pt
wRt/It) -2.88*  -4.31***  -2.84*  -4.32*** 
log(Pt
d) -1.10  -3.08  -1.53  -1.47 
log(Pt
wRt) -2.44  -2.96  -2.44  -2.99 
log(It) -1.72  -2.53  -1.89 -2.35 
log(Pt
w) -3.85*** -3.56**  -3.89***  -3.54** 
 
Notes: Asterisks correspond to significance levels of 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*). 
Source: Authors calculations  
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Table 5. Regression results for price pass-through, WCA countries, 1970 to 2005 
 
 Benin  Burkina  Faso  Cameroon  Chad 
log(Pt
d/It) = μ + β1log(Pt
wRt/It) + β2t + εt 












β1    0.09 
(1.09) 
  0.09 
(0.99) 
  0.24** 
(2.60) 
  0.12 
(0.95) 












2    0.03    0.14    0.30    0.18 












d) = μ + β1log(Pt
wRt) + β2log(It) + β3t + εt 












β1    0.08 
(0.98) 
  0.10 
(1.27) 
  0.26** 
(2.33) 
  0.11 
(0.84) 
























2    0.97    0.96    0.93    0.92 












d) = μ + β1log(Pt
w) + β2log(Rt) + β3log(It) + β4t + εt 
















  0.20* 
(1.62) 
  0.18 
(1.40) 




































2    0.98    0.97    0.93    0.93 











Continued next page  
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Table 5 cont. Regression results for price pass-through, WCA countries, 1970 to 2005 
 
 Côte  d’Ivoire  Mali  Senegal Togo 
log(Pt
d/It) = μ + β1log(Pt
wRt/It) + β2t + εt 












β1    0.13 
(1.14) 
  0.05 
(0.76) 
  0.14* 
(2.02) 
  0.09 
(1.14) 












2    0.18    0.00    0.08    0.08 












d) = μ + β1log(Pt
wRt) + β2log(It) + β3t + εt 












β1    0.21** 
(2.26) 
  0.05 
(0.84) 
  0.14* 
(2.18) 
  0.11 
(1.28) 
























2    0.94    0.98    0.98    0.96 












d) = μ + β1log(Pt
w) + β2log(Rt) + β3log(It) + β4t + εt 












β1    0.14 
(1.41) 
  0.05 
(0.66) 








































2    0.94    0.98    0.98    0.97 













d denotes the price received by growers (nominal CFAf, seed cotton); Pt
w denotes the A Index (nominal 
US$, converted to seed cotton equivalent by using the ginning outturn ratio); Rt denotes the CFAf/US$ 
exchange rate (period average); It denotes the GDP deflator; t denotes time trend; μ, β1, β2, β3, and β4 denote 
parameters to be estimated (absolute t-ratios in parentheses). For other definitions see Table 5. 
Source: Authors calculations  
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Table 6. Calculating the NRA for Benin, 1970/71 to 1974/75 
 
Description  Cost Adjustment  Cotton price (kg)/NRA 
World price, lint per kg (Pt
W)   $  0.69 
International freight costs (Ct
F)  $ 0.06/kg, lint  $ 0.63 
Exchange rate (Rt)  CFAf 276/$  CFAf 174 
Inland transport costs (Ct
I)  CFAf 8/kg, lint  CFAf 166 
Ginning costs (Ct
G)  CFAf 38/kg, lint  CFAf 128 
Ginning outturn ratio  seed = 38.1% of lint  CFAf 49 
Grower’s price  CFAf 34/kg, seed  CFAf 34 
NRA1970/71 100*(34/49-1)  -30% 
NRA1971/72 100*(35/59-1)  -41% 
NRA1972/73 100*(35/59-1)  -41% 
NRA1973/74 100*(37/123-1)  -70% 





Source: Authors calculations  
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A INDEX (constant 2000, CFAf/kg of seed cotton)         
1970-84  532  438  508 405  639 585 506 532 
1985-93  380  290  284 326  392 329 289 345 
1994-97  503  466  445 468  497 465 467 478 
1998-2005  309  304  322 291  312 298 316 303 
PRICES RECEIVED BY COTTON GROWERS (constant 2000, CFAf/kg of seed cotton)     
1970-84  195  146  208 134  282 172 171 188 
1985-93  209  148  178 170  204 156 156 179 
1994-97  218  176  198 183  204 168 199 204 
1998-2005  190  177  176 161  178 170 183 177 
PRODUCER’S SHARE OF THE A INDEX (percent)     
1970-84  38  35  42 34  45 30 35 37 
1985-93  56  52  64 53  53 49 55 53 
1994-97  45  39  44 40  42 37 43 43 
1998-2005  62  59  59 56  57 59 59 59 
PRICE VARIABILITY (Z-Statistic)
a     
A  Index  124  116  111  96  150 130 115 135 
Domestic    18    19    24  18    26    22    13    19 
Ratio      7      6      5    5      6      6      9      7 
NAC
b (percent, 100 implies no assistance, < 100 implies taxation)—based on reported ginning costs 
1970-84    57    55    66    56    69    47    53    56 
1985-93  104  102  133  115    99    96  102    96 
1994-97    64    58    72    63    62    56    62    63 
1998-2005  109  113  110 114  105 113 104 103 
NAC
b (percent, 100 implies no assistance, < 100 implies taxation)—based on assumed actual ginning costs 
1970-84  53  50     61  51  63 43 48 51 
1985-93  91  89 114  98  87 83 89 85 
1994-97  60  54     66  58  58 52 58 58 
1998-2005  96  99     96  99  92 99 92 91 
 
a The row titled “Ratio” is the ratio of the Z-statistic of the “A Index” to that of the 
“Domestic” price, where the Z-statistic is the square root of the average squared deviation of 
the price from its value lagged one period (or the first difference in the price – see Schiff and 
Valdes 1992, Appendix 3-2). For example, for Benin the year-to-year variability of the world 
price has been 7 times higher than the year-to-year variability of the price received by cotton 
growers (both prices having been expressed in domestic currency and in real terms using the 
GDP deflator).  
b NAC is the nominal assistance coefficient, expressing the grower return as a percentage of 
the international price adjusted for freight rates and inland transport costs as well as ginning 
costs and the “inefficiency” factor. 
Source: Author’s calculations using data from various national publications.  
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Table 8. Nominal Rate of Assistance, WCA countries, 1970 to 2005 
(percent) 
 
  1970-74  1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-05 
Benin  -44  -49 -49     -5 -24 -22     -6 
Burkina Faso  -44  -48  -58    -8  -26  -28     1 
Cameroon  -41  -40 -37   33 -18 -22       3 
Chad  -47  -48  -52     6  -21  -21    -3 
Côte d’Ivoire  -32  -28 -50     -5 -30 -27     -5 
Mali  -56  -55 -59 -17 -25 -33       3 
Senegal  -46  -50 -59 -10 -19 -29 -11 
Togo  -41  -46 -60 -14 -25 -24 -13 
Average  -45  -44 -52     -3 -25 -26     -4 
 
Notes: The underlying figures are the same as the ones used for the lower panel of Table 5, with two 
differences: (i) 0 (instead of 100) implies no assistance while <0 (>0) implies taxation (subsidization) and (ii) 
they represent 5-year averages. 
Source: Authors calculations  
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FIGURE 12: Nominal Rate of Assistance (percent, average)













Appendix A: The Cotlook A Index 
 
 
The most commonly used world cotton price indicator is the Cotlook A Index. It is an index 
compiled daily by Cotton Outlook, a private company located in Liverpool, UK. Every day, 
the editorial staff of Cotton Outlook, who have no trading involvement in cotton “establish 
what they consider to be the representative level of competitive offering rates prevailing in 
the market for each of the eligible growths.” The A Index is the average of the 5 lowest 
quotations of 18 styles of cotton (Middling 1-3/32’’), C/F Far Eastern values, from the 
following origins: Australia, Benin, Brazil, Burkina Faso, China, Greece, India, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Mali, Pakistan, Paraguay, Syria, Tanzania, Turkey, US (3 types), and Uzbekistan. 
Quotations from numerous other origins are also reported but do not participate in the A 
Index. 
The index is calculated as the average of the five least expensive quotations to 
account for the fact that quotations reflect offering prices, not the level at which business has 
been arranged—a buyer is normally expected to succeed with bids that are lower than quoted. 
The quotations represent nearby delivery, normally between two and four months. Table A1 




Table A1. Composition of the A Index  
(US cents per pound) 
 
Origin  March 02, 2006  March 16, 2006  Shipment 
01.  Australia  NQ  NQ   
02.  Benin  59.50*  58.75*  March/April 
03.  Brazil  62.50  61.00  August/September 
04.  Burkina Faso  60.25  59.50  March/April 
05.  China  NQ  NQ   
06.  Greece  60.25  59.50  March/April 
07.  India  55.00*  55.50*  March/April 
08.  Côte d’Ivoire  60.25  58.75  March/April 
09.  Mali  59.75*  58.50*  March/April 
10.  Pakistan  NQ  NQ   
11.  Paraguay  61.75  60.75  April/May 
12.  Syria  60.50  59.50  March/April 
13.  Tanzania  NQ  NQ   
14.  Turkey  NQ  NQ   
15.  US (California/Arizona)  66.00  65.25  March/April 
16.  US (Memphis/Eastern) 60.75  60.00  April/May 
17.  US (Memphis/Orleans)  59.25*  58.50*  April/May 
18.  Uzbekistan  59.75*  58.75*  March/April 
A INDEX  58.65  58.00   
 
Notes: NQ indicates no quotation. (*) indicates that the quotation is one of the 5 least expensive and thus 
eligible for the A Index. 
 
Source: Cotton Outlook, March 03, and March 17, 2006 issues.  
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Appendix B: Definitons and sources of data 
 
 
This appendix describes the data which cover the 1970-2005 period. The next eight tables 
(B1-B8) report country-specific data, Table B9 reports cif-to-fob costs figures. Table B11 
reports data on cotton production, area, and yields for the WCA and the world. All quantity 
statistics and prices received by producers refer to crop years while GDP deflators are in 
calendar years. Seed cotton was converted to cotton lint by using the ginning outturn ratio 
reported in Tables B1-B8. 
All price data refer to 1
st grade cotton lint. Production refers to cotton lint. Yields are 
expressed in terms of cotton lint per hectare. Prices received by growers, expressed in terms 
of CFAf per kg of seed cotton, include bonuses. Data for Benin are from SONAPRA; prices 
received by growers include bonus (after 1990/91) as well as government subsidies between 
2001/02 and 2005/06. Data for Burkina Faso are from SOFITEX; following 1995/96, prices 
received by growers include bonus. Data for Cameroon are from SODECOTON; following 
1994/95, prices include bonus. Data for Chad are from Cotonchad; bonus has been paid in 
only 4 years. Data for Côte d’Ivoire are from CIDT; prices include bonus after 1995/96. Data 
for Mali are from CMDT; price include bonus after 1990/91. Data for Senegal are from 
SODEFITEX; bonus is included in only three years. Data for Togo are from SOTOCO; 
prices do not include any bonus. 
The A Index (reported in Table B9, see Appendix A for a description) is taken from 
the World Bank’s Commodity Price database (the original source is Cotton Outlook) and has 
been expressed as March-July average to reflect the marketing season in WCA countries. The 
CFAf/US$ exchange rate (March-July average) is taken from the IMF (International 
Financial Statistics). The Manufacture Unit Value (MUV), used as an inflation proxy for the 
US$-based A Index, represents the unit value index in dollar terms of manufactures exported 
from the G-5—France, Germany, Japan, UK, and the US—weighted in proportion to the 
countries’ exports to developing countries. It is prepared by the World Bank’s Development 
Prospects Group. The GDP deflators for all countries are taken from the IMF (International 
Financial Statistics) and supplemented by the World Bank’s Development Prospects Group 
estimates prior to 1980. 
The sea transport costs, expressed as $/ton (Table B9) are the same for all countries 
since freight rates between the WCA sea ports and the ports of North Europe or South-East 
Asia are roughly the same. In nominal terms, sea freight costs have fluctuated between a high  
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of $120/ton in 1984/85 and a low of $35/ton in 1970/71. Marketing costs, also reported in 
Table B9 are typically expressed as percent of the A Index (3 percent until 2002/03 and 2.6 
percent afterwards); they have been expressed as $/ton. The last two column of the table 
expresses the fob-to-cif costs as a percentage of the A Index. Ginning costs are also reported 
in Table B9; they represent average ginning costs for the entire WCA as they are reported in 
the financial statements of the cotton companies. Lastly, domestic transportation costs are 
reported in Table B10 (CFAf/kg of cotton lint, nominal terms). As expected, they vary 
greatly across countries, with land-locked countries having the highest costs (e.g., Chad) 
while countries with access to ports having the lowest (e.g., Benin, Senegal, and Togo).  
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1970/71 14  39  351  38.1  34  0.16 
1971/72 18  55  333  38.4  35  0.16 
1972/73 19  48  396  37.9  35  0.17 
1973/74 17  53  329  38.6  37  0.17 
1974/75 13  49  256  40.5  45  0.20 
1975/76 8  32  248  39.5  45  0.23 
1976/77 7  26  260  38.7  50  0.26 
1977/78 5  21  249  37.7  55  0.27 
1978/79 7  26  275  38.2  55  0.31 
1979/80 10  26  372  37.6  55  0.35 
1980/81 5  30  167  37.8  60  0.38 
1981/82 5  24  228  37.9  80  0.41 
1982/83 12  24  490  37.9  85  0.48 
1983/84 17  40  430  37.4  100  0.50 
1984/85 33  56  597  37.8  100  0.51 
1985/86 34  100  338  38.0  110  0.49 
1986/87 48  103  464  39.0  110  0.47 
1987/88 27  72  380  38.9  100  0.48 
1988/89 44  97  456  40.5  105  0.48 
1989/90 43  111  383  40.7  95  0.49 
1990/91 59  123  482  41.2  100  0.50 
1991/92 75  144  518  42.2  100  0.50 
1992/93 69  139  493  42.5  100  0.52 
1993/94 103  235  439  41.9  110  0.53 
1994/95 98  230  426  41.9  140  0.70 
1995/96 141  294  481  40.5  180  0.81 
1996/97 143  292  491  41.2  200  0.86 
1997/98 150  386  389  41.8  200  0.91 
1998/99 138  394  351  41.3  225  0.95 
1999/00 152  372  409  41.9  185  0.97 
2000/01 141  337  418  41.5  200  1.00 
2001/02 172  357  482  42.1  200  1.03 
2002/03 143  313  457  42.4  185  1.05 
2003/04 142  323  440  42.5  205  1.11 
2004/05 171  325  527  41.8  190  1.08 
2005/06 82  200  408  41.8  185  1.14 
 
Source: SONAPRA for cotton statistics; IMF (International Financial Statistics) and World Bank estimates for 
GDP deflator.  
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1970/71 8  81  105  35.9  32  0.20 
1971/72 10  74  141  37.2  32  0.20 
1972/73 12  70  171  36.7  32  0.22 
1973/74 10  67  147  36.8  35  0.22 
1974/75 11  62  184  37.1  40  0.25 
1975/76 18  68  267  35.8  40  0.27 
1976/77 20  79  255  36.6  40  0.28 
1977/78 14  69  202  36.5  55  0.34 
1978/79 22  72  312  37.3  55  0.39 
1979/80 29  82  350  37.0  55  0.42 
1980/81 23  75  311  37.3  55  0.45 
1981/82 22  65  331  37.6  62  0.51 
1982/83 29  72  400  38.1  62  0.56 
1983/84 30  77  392  37.9  70  0.59 
1984/85 34  82  418  39.0  90  0.63 
1985/86 46  94  489  39.8  100  0.66 
1986/87 66  127  520  39.8  100  0.61 
1987/88 59  170  344  39.6  95  0.62 
1988/89 59  171  344  40.3  95  0.64 
1989/90 62  150  416  41.0  95  0.67 
1990/91 77  166  465  40.8  95  0.68 
1991/92 69  186  373  41.4  95  0.66 
1992/93 69  177  392  42.4  85  0.66 
1993/94 51  150  339  43.6  115  0.64 
1994/95 63  184  341  43.9  115  0.76 
1995/96 64  170  377  42.4  165  0.82 
1996/97 90  196  460  42.1  180  0.88 
1997/98 140  295  476  41.5  180  0.90 
1998/99 119  355  335  41.8  185  0.97 
1999/00 109  245  445  42.9  185  0.95 
2000/01 116  260  446  42.0  170  1.00 
2001/02 158  359  440  41.8  200  1.05 
2002/03 170  405  420  42.1  175  1.09 
2003/04 204  459  444  42.2  185  1.11 
2004/05 264  566  467  41.9  210  1.13 
2005/06 298  646  462  41.9  175  1.16 
 
Source: SOFITEX for cotton statistics; IMF (International Financial Statistics) and World Bank estimates for 
GDP deflator.  
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1970/71 14  102  139  36.9  30  0.16 
1971/72 16  99  160  36.6  31  0.17 
1972/73 17  88  191  37.0  38  0.18 
1973/74 10  61  170  37.3  40  0.19 
1974/75 15  65  234  37.7  45  0.21 
1975/76 19  73  261  38.5  45  0.23 
1976/77 18  60  303  38.1  55  0.27 
1977/78 15  48  317  37.8  65  0.29 
1978/79 23  47  495  39.2  65  0.30 
1979/80 31  57  544  38.4  70  0.34 
1980/81 32  65  494  38.2  80  0.38 
1981/82 31  63  486  38.5  90  0.42 
1982/83 29  55  523  39.5  105  0.47 
1983/84 37  71  519  39.0  117  0.53 
1984/85 38  73  522  39.2  130  0.60 
1985/86 46  89  514  39.7  140  0.67 
1986/87 48  94  513  39.5  150  0.67 
1987/88 45  95  476  39.6  140  0.66 
1988/89 69  112  614  41.4  140  0.66 
1989/90 43  89  482  41.3  95  0.65 
1990/91 47  94  496  41.1  95  0.66 
1991/92 47  90  524  41.2  95  0.68 
1992/93 53  99  534  41.9  85  0.67 
1993/94 52  103  503  40.9  130  0.69 
1994/95 63  141  445  41.1  155  0.76 
1995/96 79  159  495  40.3  180  0.89 
1996/97 90  191  471  41.2  180  0.94 
1997/98 73  172  425  40.2  190  0.97 
1998/99 78  173  453  40.3  195  0.98 
1999/00 78  172  455  40.7  165  0.97 
2000/01 96  199  482  41.6  225  1.00 
2001/02 103  211  487  41.6  175  1.03 
2002/03 95  181  526  41.1  180  1.07 
2003/04 100  208  480  41.2  185  1.09 
2004/05 125  215  581  40.8  190  1.09 
2005/06 87  214  405  41.7  150  1.14 
 
Source: SODECOTON for cotton statistics; IMF (International Financial Statistics) and World Bank estimates 
for GDP deflator.  
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1970/71 35  303  114  36.4  26  0.21 
1971/72 41  302  136  37.8  28  0.23 
1972/73 39  276  140  37.2  28  0.25 
1973/74 43  269  160  37.6  30  0.26 
1974/75 53  272  195  37.0  43  0.27 
1975/76 65  336  192  37.1  43  0.29 
1976/77 54  319  169  36.6  45  0.32 
1977/78 45  284  160  36.2  50  0.35 
1978/79 50  267  188  36.6  50  0.38 
1979/80 33  180  184  36.3  50  0.41 
1980/81 31  166  188  36.4  60  0.45 
1981/82 26  134  196  36.7  60  0.49 
1982/83 38  138  277  37.3  70  0.53 
1983/84 60  176  341  37.8  80  0.53 
1984/85 36  142  250  36.9  100  0.66 
1985/86 39  148  260  38.7  100  0.62 
1986/87 34  124  275  38.2  100  0.52 
1987/88 48  149  322  37.5  100  0.50 
1988/89 53  199  264  38.2  100  0.55 
1989/90 58  185  314  38.3  90  0.54 
1990/91 60  206  292  38.0  90  0.59 
1991/92 68  283  240  38.9  90  0.60 
1992/93 47  199  237  38.9  80  0.53 
1993/94 37  158  234  39.1  90  0.52 
1994/95 61  203  301  39.6  120  0.74 
1995/96 62  208  298  39.4  140  0.81 
1996/97 86  285  301  40.4  170  0.90 
1997/98 103  336  307  39.8  194  0.93 
1998/99 66  298  222  40.5  170  1.02 
1999/00 75  300  249  40.6  150  0.95 
2000/01 58  240  242  40.6  185  1.00 
2001/02 67  312  216  41.0  165  1.12 
2002/03 69  281  245  41.0  160  1.17 
2003/04 42  238  176  41.2  160  1.14 
2004/05 85  310  274  41.0  190  1.06 
2005/06 74  315  233  40.5  160  1.17 
 
Source: Cotonchad for cotton statistics; IMF (International Financial Statistics) and World Bank estimates for 
GDP deflator.  
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1970/71 12  36  325  39.7  40  0.12 
1971/72 20  51  384  40.7  40  0.12 
1972/73 21  56  378  40.4  40  0.12 
1973/74 23  58  397  39.5  45  0.14 
1974/75 24  59  409  39.9  70  0.18 
1975/76 26  65  401  40.4  70  0.19 
1976/77 31  65  475  40.8  80  0.22 
1977/78 41  88  473  40.2  80  0.28 
1978/79 47  107  435  40.7  80  0.30 
1979/80 59  123  480  41.3  80  0.32 
1980/81 56  126  441  40.8  80  0.39 
1981/82 56  125  453  41.7  80  0.40 
1982/83 66  128  512  41.9  80  0.44 
1983/84 58  136  428  41.0  100  0.48 
1984/85 88  146  606  41.7  115  0.56 
1985/86 82  153  538  43.5  115  0.56 
1986/87 93  159  586  44.1  115  0.55 
1987/88 114  180  631 44.5  115  0.53 
1988/89 128  213  601 44.1  115  0.53 
1989/90 107  201  534 44.5  115  0.52 
1990/91 116  199  583 44.3  100  0.50 
1991/92 87  190  456  44.8  90  0.50 
1992/93 106  224  471 44.2  90  0.50 
1993/94 116  219  527 44.7  110  0.53 
1994/95 93  242  383  44.3  160  0.78 
1995/96 96  204  472  44.4  173  0.87 
1996/97 114  211  542 43.0  182  0.91 
1997/98 147  244  601 43.6  205  0.95 
1998/99 157  271  577 42.9  200  1.00 
1999/00 177  291  608 44.1  183  1.01 
2000/01 123  248  493 42.7  216  1.00 
2001/02 171  283  605 43.2  190  1.04 
2002/03 172  270  637 43.4  180  1.07 
2003/04 78  206  352  40.4  200  1.09 
2004/05 140  263  539 44.6  185  1.11 
2005/06 113  299  422 43.0  140  1.12 
 





















1970/71  20 66 303  37.7  25  0.13 
1971/72  25 77 327  37.3  25  0.14 
1972/73  24 77 315  36.8  25  0.15 
1973/74  19 69 273  37.3  25  0.16 
1974/75  23 69 332  37.6  38  0.17 
1975/76  39 89 438  37.9  38  0.20 
1976/77 45  110  412 38.3  38  0.23 
1977/78 42  103  411 37.2  45  0.25 
1978/79 48  118  407 37.7  45  0.27 
1979/80 56  127  441 37.3  58  0.30 
1980/81 41  111  367 37.6  58  0.35 
1981/82  38 85 448  39.5  65  0.39 
1982/83 50  105  474 39.1  65  0.44 
1983/84 54  111  487 38.6  75  0.47 
1984/85 55  119  464 38.4  75  0.53 
1985/86 67  146  460 38.4  85  0.61 
1986/87 79  152  518 39.0  85  0.55 
1987/88 75  149  504 37.7  85  0.56 
1988/89 97  190  511 39.0  85  0.55 
1989/90 99  189  521 42.8  85  0.54 
1990/91 115  205  558  41.5  93  0.57 
1991/92 114  215  531  42.0  95  0.58 
1992/93 135  246  547  42.2  95  0.59 
1993/94 101  201  500  41.8  98  0.61 
1994/95 128  270  475  43.7  130  0.78 
1995/96 169  336  504  41.7  155  0.92 
1996/97 190  420  451  41.9  155  0.97 
1997/98 218  498  437  41.9  170  0.98 
1998/99 217  504  431  41.6  185  0.98 
1999/00 197  482  409  42.8  150  0.95 
2000/01 102  228  447  42.0  170  1.00 
2001/02 240  532  451  42.0  200  1.00 
2002/03 181  449  402  41.1  180  1.16 
2003/04 254  549  464  41.0  200  1.19 
2004/05 240  547  439  40.9  210  1.17 
2005/06 222  551  403  41.5  168  1.20 
 






















1970/71 4  14  306  35.3  28 0.17 
1971/72 8  18  422  36.5  30 0.17 
1972/73 9  20  418  36.6  32 0.18 
1973/74 12  29  415 36.2  35  0.19 
1974/75 15  40  387 36.4  47  0.22 
1975/76 11  39  291 37.1  47  0.25 
1976/77 17  44  382 37.1  49  0.26 
1977/78 13  47  284 35.9  49  0.28 
1978/79 13  48  262 37.4  49  0.30 
1979/80 10  31  313 36.0  55  0.33 
1980/81 7  30  242  35.1  60 0.37 
1981/82 15  32  477 37.2  68  0.40 
1982/83 18  42  438 39.1  70  0.43 
1983/84 12  33  352 38.6  70  0.47 
1984/85 19  46  409 40.4  70  0.53 
1985/86 11  39  280 39.0  100  0.58 
1986/87 11  25  421 39.9  100  0.63 
1987/88 15  29  531 39.5  100  0.64 
1988/89 15  39  402 40.0  100  0.65 
1989/90 12  24  503 41.5  100  0.66 
1990/91 18  45  407 40.7  100  0.67 
1991/92 20  44  459 40.1  100  0.67 
1992/93 19  45  429 40.3  100  0.67 
1993/94 16  44  361 40.7  110  0.66 
1994/95 12  34  356 42.2  166  0.85 
1995/96 13  35  378 42.2  170  0.89 
1996/97 16  50  322 42.2  170  0.90 
1997/98 17  54  316 42.3  185  0.94 
1998/99 5  48  99  41.4 185 0.96 
1999/00 7  18  373  42.5 185 0.97 
2000/01 9  21  416  43.3 185 1.00 
2001/02 14  32  447 43.0  185  1.03 
2002/03 17  35  478 43.2  185  1.05 
2003/04 22  46  479 42.9  185  1.06 
2004/05 17  44  387 42.0  195  1.06 
2005/06 19  48  395 40.6  195  1.07 
 
Source: SODEFITEX for cotton statistics; IMF (International Financial Statistics) and World Bank estimates for 
GDP deflator.  
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1970/71 2  4  496  37.6  35  0.16 
1971/72 3  9  290  37.4  35  0.17 
1972/73 2  7  293  37.3  35  0.17 
1973/74 3  10  333  36.7  40  0.18 
1974/75 4  15  280  37.9  48  0.25 
1975/76 4  19  186  35.8  48  0.24 
1976/77 3  9  322  40.9  50  0.28 
1977/78 2  7  266  39.0  60  0.34 
1978/79 5  16  343  37.9  60  0.29 
1979/80 8  26  294  38.0  60  0.32 
1980/81 9  29  312  37.9  60  0.35 
1981/82 8  23  353  39.0  65  0.39 
1982/83 11  27  414 41.1  65  0.42 
1983/84 10  30  340 41.6  75  0.48 
1984/85 23  44  520 42.1  90  0.49 
1985/86 27  69  390 41.8  105  0.51 
1986/87 30  61  486 42.3  105  0.54 
1987/88 31  68  457 41.6  105  0.55 
1988/89 33  81  405 42.0  95  0.56 
1989/90 34  76  440 42.0  95  0.56 
1990/91 41  80  513 41.8  100  0.58 
1991/92 41  78  520 40.6  100  0.60 
1992/93 42  80  526 41.9  90  0.62 
1993/94 35  65  539 41.8  110  0.57 
1994/95 55  93  591 41.8  145  0.77 
1995/96 42  96  436 40.4  170  0.85 
1996/97 61  108  559 41.3  180  0.90 
1997/98 73  135  541 42.0  210  0.92 
1998/99 78  159  491 41.1  200  1.01 
1999/00 56  154  364 40.0  190  1.02 
2000/01 49  135  363 41.9  200  1.00 
2001/02 69  173  397 41.6  200  1.03 
2002/03 66  194  342 41.5  175  1.05 
2003/04 68  187  366 41.5  175  1.01 
2004/05 72  199  361 41.5  175  1.11 
2005/06 28  105  270 41.7  160  1.14 
 
Source: SOTOCO for cotton statistics; IMF (International Financial Statistics) and World Bank estimates for 
GDP deflator.  
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Table B9. Ginning and fob-to-cif costs, all WCA countries, 1970 to 2006 
(nominal terms) 
 
  Nominal  Exchange  Ginning  Sea Freight  Marketing  Fob to cif Costs 
 A  Index  Rate Costs Costs Costs  (CFAf/kg  (%  of  the 
Year ($/kg)  (CFAf/$)  (CFAf/kg)  ($/ton)  ($/ton)  of lint)  A Index) 
1970/71  0.69  276    50    35  21  15  8.1 
1971/72  0.82  262    50    35  25  15  7.3 
1972/73  0.92  237    50    40  28  15  7.4 
1973/74  1.69  233    55    50  51  24  6.0 
1974/75  1.16  220    60    55  35  19  7.8 
1975/76  1.44  228    65    60  43  24  7.2 
1976/77  1.84  248    75    60  55  28  6.3 
1977/78  1.43  237    80    65  43  25  7.5 
1978/79  1.68  216    90    70  50  26  7.2 
1979/80  1.88 208 100     75  56 28  7.0 
1980/81  2.08 243 110     80  62 37  6.9 
1981/82  1.63 301 120     85  49 43  8.2 
1982/83  1.69 359 130     90  51 52  8.3 
1983/84  1.93 414 140 110  58 72  8.7 
1984/85  1.52 472 145 120  46 75  10.9 
1985/86  1.08 378 150 110  32 50  13.2 
1986/87  1.37 316 150 100  41 43  10.3 
1987/88  1.60 295 135     95  48 42  8.9 
1988/89  1.46 308 120     95  44 44  9.5 
1989/90  1.77 305 125     95  53 42  8.4 
1990/91  1.81 273 120     90  54 40  8.0 
1991/92  1.50 281 115     90  45 36  9.0 
1992/93  1.30 269 120     90  39 36  9.9 
1993/94  1.50 411 150     90  45 68  9.0 
1994/95  2.02 522 175     90  61 77  7.5 
1995/96  1.91 500 190     90  57 75  7.7 
1996/97  1.76 538 200     80  53 75  7.5 
1997/98  1.64 598 210     75  49 74  7.6 
1998/99  1.35 593 225     70  40 67  8.2 
1999/00  1.20 649 230     65  36 70  8.4 
2000/01  1.27 731 245     60  38 72  7.7 
2001/02  0.97 731 225     55  29 60  8.6 
2002/03  1.16 648 220     60  35 57  8.2 
2003/04  1.47 555 215     55  38 50  6.3 
2004/05  1.23 524 220     55  32 46  7.1 
2005/06  1.24 535 225     60  32 49  7.4 
 
Notes: The A Index (cotton lint) and the CFAf/$ exchange rate have been calculated over as a March to July 
average to account for the fact that most cotton is marketed during this period. Marketing costs have been 
calculated as 3% of the A Index up to 2002/03 and 2.6% afterwards. The ginning costs are the ones reported by 
the cotton companies (averages for the entire WCA) and they are expressed in terms of cotton lint.  
Source: Country sources (see Tables B1-B8), World Bank and IMF (International Financial Statistics).  
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Table B10. Domestic transport costs, WCA countries, 1970 to 2006  
















1970/71    8  13  14  20    8  12    7    7 
1971/72    8  14  15  22    8  12    7    7 
1972/73    9  14  15  22    9  12    7    7 
1973/74    9  15  16  23    9  13    8    9 
1974/75  11 17  18 26  11 15     9 10 
1975/76  12 18  19 27  12 15 10 11 
1976/77  13 20  21 30  14 17 11 13 
1977/78  15 24  22 31  16 19 11 13 
1978/79  17 26  24 33  17 21 12 13 
1979/80  18 28  27 36  20 23 14 14 
1980/81  20 31  30 40  22 27 15 16 
1981/82  22 35  33 42  23 30 16 17 
1982/83  25 37  38 48  26 33 18 19 
1983/84  26 40  42 52  29 36 20 20 
1984/85  25 42  48 60  31 41 22 21 
1985/86  24 41  50 60  31 42 24 22 
1986/87  24 40  50 60  30 40 25 23 
1987/88  24 40  50 60  30 40 25 23 
1988/89  24 39  50 60  28 40 25 23 
1989/90  24 39  48 58  27 37 25 23 
1990/91  24 40  48 58  26 37 25 23 
1991/92  25 40  45 55  26 38 25 23 
1992/93  25 40  45 55  27 39 25 24 
1993/94  28 45  50 60  35 57 28 26 
1994/95  30 55  65 75  45 60 32 28 
1995/96  30 58  70 80  50 65 33 28 
1996/97  31 58  74 84  51 66 34 30 
1997/98  32 58  76 86  52 67 35 31 
1998/99  33 58  76 86  53 68 36 32 
1999/00  34 60  76 86  53 69 37 33 
2000/01  35 65  79 89  54 70 38 34 
2001/02  36 70  81 92  56 72 39 35 
2002/03  37 71  84 95  57 75 39 36 
2003/04  38 72  85 96  58 76 39 37 
2004/05  39 73  87 97  59 77 40 38 
2005/06  40 75  90  100  60 78 40 39 
 
Notes: Based on actual costs from 1986-87 through 2005/06; between 1970-71 and 1985-86 extrapolated based 
on country’s GDP deflator. 




Table B11. Cotton production, area and yields, WCA countries compared to the rest of 
the world, 1970 to 2006 
 
















1970/71 11,740  31,778  369    109  644  169 
1971/72 12,938  33,024  392    141  686  205 
1972/73 13,595  33,818  402    143  643  222 
1973/74 13,615  32,558  418    138  616  224 
1974/75 13,926  33,285  418    158  629  252 
1975/76 11,706  30,001  390    190  723  263 
1976/77 12,385  31,513  393    195  712  274 
1977/78 13,860  34,966  396    179  666  268 
1978/79 12,933  34,000  380    216  702  308 
1979/80 14,084  33,100  425    235  652  360 
1980/81 13,831  33,667  411    204  633  323 
1981/82 14,991  33,948  442    202  551  366 
1982/83 14,479  32,569  445    253  591  427 
1983/84 14,499  32,137  451    279  675  413 
1984/85 19,247  35,217  547    327  708  461 
1985/86 17,461  32,792  532    351  838  419 
1986/87 15,269  29,503  518    409  846  483 
1987/88 17,609  31,238  564    414  911  454 
1988/89 18,301  33,522  546    498  1,101  452 
1989/90 17,365  31,640  549    458  1,026  446 
1990/91 18,978  33,050  574    533  1,118  477 
1991/92 20,677  34,710  596    521  1,232  423 
1992/93 17,943  32,238  557    539  1,209  446 
1993/94 16,861  30,430  554    510  1,176  434 
1994/95 18,762  32,114  584    573  1,398  410 
1995/96 20,330  36,056  564    667  1,502  444 
1996/97 19,599  34,111  575    790  1,753  451 
1997/98 20,094  33,746  595    921  2,120  435 
1998/99 18,705  32,846  569    858  2,202  390 
1999/00 19,095  31,929  598    851  2,034  418 
2000/01 19,457  31,766  612    693  1,668  415 
2001/02 21,500  33,396  644    994  2,258  440 
2002/03 19,297  29,872  646    913  2,128  429 
2003/04 20,714  32,021  647    906  2,216  409 
2004/05 26,290  35,332  744    1,119  2,474  452 
2005/06 24,752  34,252  723    923    2,349  393 
 
Source: World data are from ICAC and WCA data are from the cotton companies. WCA refers to the sum of the 
8 countries studied here.  
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Faso Chad Mali Togo
unweighted 
average 
1970 -31 -28 -39 -47 -28 -34 
1971 -43 -44 -49 -54 -42 -46 
1972 -43 -45 -50 -57 -43 -47 
1973 -69 -69 -73 -78 -65 -71 
1974 -42 -41 -34 -47 -34 -39 
1975 -51 -50 -46 -59 -42 -50 
1976 -63 -68 -63 -73 -65 -66 
1977 -41 -37 -40 -47 -38 -40 
1978 -50 -47 -50 -58 -46 -50 
1979 -48 -45 -47 -43 -44 -45 
1980 -52 -54 -47 -55 -53 -52 
1981 -33 -45 -45 -48 -48 -44 
1982 -46 -60 -53 -61 -63 -57 
1983 -55 -68 -63 -67 -70 -64 
1984 -46 -51 -40 -59 -57 -51 
1985 14  6 19 -6 -2 7 
1986 5 0  13 -14 -8 -1 
1987 -19 -20  -5 -25 -21 -18 
1988 -10 -14  3 -20 -22 -13 
1989 -42 -41 -37 -49 -44 -43 
1990 -30 -30 -25 -33 -31 -30 
1991 -15 -13  -7 -15 -12 -12 
1992 17  8 21 21 6 15 
1993 -19 -14 -21 -21 -19 -19 
1994 -61 -68 -62 -64 -59 -63 
1995 -37 -43 -46 -45 -41 -42 
1996 -28 -34 -32 -42 -35 -34 
1997 -32 -36 -25 -40 -29 -32 
1998 3  -12 2 -10 -8 -5 
1999 -9 -6  3 -22 -2 -7 
2000 -23 -27 -29 -32 -24 -27 
2001 6  15 2 15 7 9 
2002 -16 -14 -15 -9 -19 -15 
2003 -17 -20 -26 -11 -28 -20 
2004 15 38 37 43 6 28 
2005 10 13 15 11 -5 9 
 
Source: Author’s calculations using the data in earlier tables 